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I. INTRODUCTION
The Polish wife of a Pennsylvania coal miner... had gone back suddenly
to Poland to visit her old father and mother who had taken sick and might
soon die. The visit over, she returned quickly to America .... On the day
before the ship made por; out on the high seas, a baby... had been born to the
returning mother. The expected had happened, "mother and child both doing
well in the Ellis Island hospital everybody delighted, until-the [immigra-
tion] inspector admitted the mother but excluded the baby .... "[The Polish
immigration quota was exhausted. Exhausted quotas also thwarted attempts
to assign the baby either to the British quota since it was born on a British
ship or the Belgian quota since the ship came from Belgium.] "oh, look here, "I
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law. Research for
this Article was made possible by a Ross McCollum Summer Research Grant.
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began wildly. "Ive got it! How could I have forgotten my law so soon? You
see, with children it's the way it is with Wills. We follow the intention.
Now it is clear enough that the mother was hurrying back so the baby
would be born here and be a native-born American citizen, no immigrant
business at all. And the baby had the same intention, only the ship was a day
late and that upset everything. But-under the law-the baby, by intention,
was born in America. It is an American baby--no baby Pole at all-no Brit-
ish, no Belgian-just good American. That's the way I rule--run up the
flag!'4
This intent of the parent and the child which the immigration in-
spector found convincing has often entered the American Framework
for citizenship. The relationship between required adherence to strict
statutory requirements and an individual's intent as prerequisites to
the acquisition of United States citizenship has been evolving since the
beginning of our nation. Certain events in Nebraska have contributed
to this process.
In June 1891, the University of Nebraska College of Law graduated
its first class and also, after approval of the Board of Regents, officially
became a part of the University of Nebraska. It is doubtful that the
-State's elected Governor was celebrating this association since he was
at that time involved in a bitter fight for his right to occupy office.
Just one month earlier, Governor James E. Boyd had been ousted
from office. This was no ordinary retirement. The State of Nebraska
was embroiled in a dispute over whether Governor Boyd was in fact a
citizen of the United States and thus entitled to hold the office of Gov-
ernor. The Nebraska Supreme Court had announced its decision that
James E. Boyd, an Irish immigrant, was not a citizen of the United
States at the time he received a plurality of the votes in the November
1890 election.2 As a result, Governor Boyd appealed his case to the
United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court issued an opinion
that has had a significant impact on the development of the law of
citizenship.3
The Supreme Court decided the case of Boyd v. Nebraska ex rel.
Thayer just eight years after it had decided another Nebraska case
that also has continuing significance in citizenship law.4 In 1884, the
Supreme Court held in Elk v. Wilkins that the fourteenth amend-
ment did not extend birth-right citizenship to every person born in the
United States. John Elk, an American Indian,5 had attempted to vote
1. Henry Currau, Ellis Island Commissioner 1922-26, commenting on FIRST QUOTA
AcT, 1921, quoted in ELLIS ISLAND: EcHOES FROM A NATION'S PAST 79 (S. Jonas
ed. 1989).
2. State ex rel. Thayer v. Boyd, 31 Neb. 682, 48 N.W. 739, 51 N.W. 602 (1891).
3. Boyd v. Nebraska ex rel Thayer, 143 U.S. 135 (1892).
4. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884). The broader implications of this case are in the
areas of civil rights and aboriginal rights which are beyond the scope of this
Article.
5. The terms "Indian" and "Native American" are used in this article interchangea-
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in a local election in Omaha, Nebraska. The election officials refused
to let him vote, apparently believing that Indians were neither citizens
of Nebraska nor of the United States, and therefore were not eligible
to vote. In each case, the Supreme Court considered subjective intent
in resolving difficult questions of citizenship.
The centennial year of the Law College also coincides with the
centennial of the federal immigration system which was eventually
broadened to include citizenship matters. By the Act of March 3, 1891,
President Benjamin Harrison signed into law a statute providing for
federal control over immigration.6 This Article examines the develop-
ment of one aspect of immigration and nationality policy, citizenship
law, in the 100 years since the beginning of the University of Nebraska
College of Law and the federal immigration system, and the impact of
the Boyd and Elk decisions. These cases provide an opportunity for
exploration of the development of the two primary classifications in
our citizenship law, naturalized citizens and birth-right citizens, and
the importance of an individual's conduct in conjunction with their
subjective intent for the acquisition or loss of citizenship.
The Constitution in its original form referred to "citizens" in nu-
merous provisions 7 but failed to define citizenship. It empowered
Congress to establish a "uniform rule of naturalization" but failed to
define naturalization. Critical citizenship questions were left unan-
swered. It took congressional action to provide a definition of citizen-
ship first by statute and subsequently in the fourteenth amendment
and eventually, to also provide a definition of naturalization. How-
ever, unresolved citizenship questions remained.
The results reached in the two Nebraska cases had a major impact
on the resolution of some citizenship questions at the time that they
were decided and continue to have significance in the resolution of
difficult citizenship issues and the general citizenship policy pursued
in the United States. The passage quoted at the beginning of this Arti-
cle suggests that intent is an essential determinant in resolving ques-
bly depending upon the usage in the source being discussed or cited. I have chosen
to use this format to reflect the terminology of those considering the issues being
discussed. This is done to give the reader not only a sense of the time in which the
source occurred but also to illustrate the continuing problem that exists with re-
gard to selecting terminology that can be used to adequately refer to various ra-
cial or ethnic groups. See, e.g., AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY 20-21 (V. Deloria, Jr., ed. 1985)(noting that "Native American" is a label
not viewed as an improvement over "Indian;" many preferring tribal references).
6. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084 (1891).
7. Citizens are referred to in the Constitution in general terms in, among others,
these various sections: U.S. CONST. art I, § 2, cl. 2 (qualifications for Representa-
tives); U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 3, cl. 3 (qualifications for Senators); U.S. CONST. art. II,
§ 1, cl. 5 (qualifications for President); U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 (privileges
and immunities of citizens); and U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (judicial power re-
garding citizens of states).
[Vol. 70:462
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tions of citizenship. The intent element received different emphasis in
resolving the Boyd citizenship questions than was placed in Elk. This
Article serves as neither an advocate nor as an opponent of the inclu-
sion of subjective intent in the resolution of different citizenship is-
sues but rather traces its role and resulting consequences in the
development of citizenship law and procedures and the influence of
the two Nebraska cases on such development.
This Article is organized into three parts. Part II sets forth a back-
ground for the understanding of citizenship law. Part III presents a
detailed description of the factual context of Boyd and Elk and an
analysis of the reasoning used by the Supreme Court to decide each
case. Finally, Part IV examines the impact of the two cases on ex-
isting citizenship law by exploring some contemporary citizenship is-
sues as they relate to: (1) the effect of individual as well as parental
intent on citizenship, (2) the requirement of strict compliance with
statutory prerequisites before citizenship is lost or acquired and, (3)
distinctions made between citizens on the basis of how citizenship is
acquired.
II. A BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF CITIZENSHIP
The consideration of citizenship or nationality law is integrally re-
lated with immigration policy. The development of policies to deal
with immigrants has included the necessity to develop a compatible
policy for the determination of which individuals should be granted or
denied citizenship. As the Supreme Court has stated, "[I]t is the in-
herent right of every independent nation to determine for itself, and
according to its own constitution and laws, what classes of persons
shall be entitled to its citizenship."s
This issue may arise in several contexts. For example, an individ-
ual's attempt to gain entry into the United States might result in the
discovery that such person is not an alien, but in fact has a claim to
United States citizenship.9 Conversely, an individual believing herself
to be a United States citizen might learn upon application for a United
States passport, that the United States considers her to be an alien
rather than a citizen.
While many immigrants view citizenship as the ultimate achieve-
ment in the immigration process, most apparently do not come to the
United States seeking immediate citizenship. The average alien waits
about eight years before applying for citizenship although eligible long
8. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 668 (1898).
9. See infra text discussion on birth abroad accompanying notes 30-31 and 251-54.
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before their actual application.3O Yet, once immigrated to the United
States, an individual faces the decision of whether she should or even
could become a citizen. When an individual forms the intent to be-
come a citizen, the first step has been accomplished.
The development of citizenship law in the United States has
shaped both social and legal aspects of relationships in our political
community. The social relationship is based upon the desired objec-
tive of common citizenship shared by an immigrant population com-
posed of people of diverse racial and ethnic groups which leads to a
social solidarity and therefore a cohesive nation. This cohesive nation
would not be possible without a legal structure that establishes indi-
vidual rights and obligations and the limits of government power. If
the shared rights and obligations derived from citizenship outweigh
the differences imposed by racial, ethnic and culture backgrounds the
result is the formation of a political community.l' The acquisition of
citizenship is a prerequisite for membership in the political
community.
Many consider citizenship law, which defines the resulting political
community, to be the most complex topic in the area of immigration
and nationality policy.12 In the United States, the fashioning of a co-
herent citizenship law has been made more difficult due to issues aris-
ing from policies relating to the citizenry that is not a part of the
immigrant population-former slaves, Native Americans, and inhabit-
ants of territories acquired by the United States. A casual considera-
tion of citizenship issues might lead one to believe that the questions
of: (1) who is a citizen, (2) what are the rights of citizens, and (3) how
one becomes a citizen of the United States were long ago resolved
since we have now had over a century to consider such issues.' 3 The
historical formation of citizenship and naturalization laws has estab-
lished a more precise definition of citizenship,14 a clearer delineation
10. 1989 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
at xxxix (1990). This figure has varied only slightly over the past 30 years.
Even earlier in our immigrant history it was concluded that, "The alien does
not come with any direct interest in citizenship. He comes to improve his status."
J. GAVIT, AMERICANS BY CHOICE (1922), republished in 8 AMERICANIZATION STUD-
iES: THE ACCULTURATION OF IMMIGRANT GROUPS INTO AMERICAN SOCIETY 18 (W.
Bernard ed. 1971)(discussing reasons for coming, freedom vs. economic.)
11. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S.
(21 Wall.) 162, 165 (1874).
12. See generally R. BOSwELL, IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY LAw 591 (1991); T.
ALEINiKOFF & D. MARTIN, IMMIGRATION PROCESS AND POLICY 833 (1st ed.)(1985);
C. GORDON & S. MAILMAN, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 11-1 (rev. ed.
1988).
13. I am measuring here from the ratification of the fourteenth amendment which is
the time most agree that the Constitution first provided answers to some of the
citizenship acquisition questions. See infra text accompanying notes 22-23.
14. For general rules governing the acquisition of citizenship, see the Immigration
[Vol. 70:462
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of rights and obligations of citizens, and a more demanding and stan-
dardized procedure for acquiring and proving a claim to citizenship.
However, the following questions remain regarding the acquisition
and retention of citizenship and the accompanying rights: (1) Should
all persons born in the United States acquire citizenship at the time of
their birth;15 (2) Are there situations when distinctions should be
made between native-born citizens and naturalized citizens;16 (3)
Should the acts of parents affect their children's right to acquire or
retain citizenship; (4) Under what circumstances should certain
groups become citizens, not as individuals, but based upon their mem-
bership in a group;17 (5) Should we embrace the concept of dual na-
tionality;18 and (6) Is citizenship important-are there certain
privileges or rights that can only be granted to citizens?19 While it is
possible to find answers to most of these questions in the applicable
law, the search is a complex one. There is a lack of consensus as to
whether our existing laws are appropriate and whether constitutional
provisions and statutes have been interpreted properly.
There are two forms of citizenship-birthright and naturalized. In
the first, a person becomes a citizen of a particular country at birth;
generally it is automatic and dependent on the operative legal rules.
In the second, a person becomes a citizen of a particular country by
voluntary choice. The eligibility of a person to become a naturalized
citizen of a particular country depends on the laws of that country.
Intent may be irrelevant to the acquisition of birthright citizenship.
However, intent is an integral part of the acquisition of citizenship by
naturalization. The Constitution allows Congress to adopt a system to
and Nationality Act of 1952, §§ 304-348, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1459 (1988). For rules
governing loss of citizenship, see icL §§ 349-357, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1481-1489. For rules
pertaining to persons who are nationals but not citizens at birth, see id- § 308, 8
U.S.C. § 1408.
15. See, e.g., P. ScHucK & R. SMITH, CrTIzNsmP WITHouT CONSENT. ILLEGAL
ALIENS IN THE AMERICAN PoLITY (1985)(questioning fourteenth amendment ac-
quisition of citizenship at birth by children of illegal aliens and non-immigrants,
i.e., temporary visitors.)
16. See infra text accompanying notes 252-66.
17. The principle of collective naturalization is invoked by this question. See infra
text accompanying note 34 & notes 267-71.
18. One alternative is to recognize the concept of dual nationality only for minors.
Upon reaching the age of majority, the individual must affirmatively select to
retain their American citizenship. See infra text accompanying notes 202-07.
19. This question is presented for consideration by Alexander Aleinikoff and David
Martin in their law school immigration text, IMMIGRATION PROCESS AND POLICY,
928 (2d ed. 1991), in connection with the presence of large numbers of permanent
residents who never become citizens and have been accorded the protections of
the Constitution. See also Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership and the Con-
stitution 7 Const. Comm. 9 (1990).
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naturalize citizens under a uniform rule of naturalization.20 In addi-
tion, the Constitution recognizes both state and national citizenship.2 '
Yet, the Constitution did not contain a provision for birthright citizen-
ship or even a definition of citizenship until the adoption of the four-
teenth amendment on July 28, 1868.22 The citizenship clause of the
fourteenth amendment provides that: "All persons born or natural-
ized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside."23
The issue of birthright citizenship is made complex by our adoption
of two doctrines, Jus soli and Jus sanquinus. Jus soli-citizenship by
soil, is a doctrine that confers citizenship to a person based on the
place of birth. An inquiry into individual intent is generally unneces-
sary. Citizenship is acquired even if the child's parents had no intent
for the child to become a United States citizen. The ratification of the
fourteenth amendment included this principle in the Constitution.
Jus sanquinus--citizenship by blood or descent, confers citizenship
based upon the citizenship of the person's parents at the time of birth.
This doctrine is not explicitly recognized in the Constitution, but has
been adopted in the United States through a series of congressional
actions. Intent becomes relevant since Congress has imposed condi-
tions upon the child's acquisition of citizenship. The principal applica-
tion of this doctrine has been to children born outside of the United
States to United States citizens. In most instances these doctrines are
not in conflict. However, questions arise when a birth occurs and the
parent(s) are not in the country of their own citizenship. Thus, there
is a conflict if a British citizen gives birth to a baby while physically in
the United States because Britain has adopted jus sanquinus citizen-
ship. In that situation, the child has acquired dual citizenship-jus soli
United States citizenship and jus sanquinus British citizenship.
The citizenship law of the United States consists of rules, conferred
by the Constitution or by statute, attempting to resolve the conflicts
associated with birthright citizenship, and the system of naturalization
law that permits citizens of other countries to become United States
20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. However, this grant of authority does not define
naturalization.
21. For example, United States citizenship is a prerequisite for election as a Repre-
sentative. "No person shall be a Representative who shall not have .. .been
seven Years a Citizen of the United States ...." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2. State
citizenship, however, is the basis for privileges and immunities: "The Citizens of
each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the
several States." U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
22. It should be noted that it is possible to be born in the United States and become a
citizen of the United States without being a citizen of a state. See, e.g., Slaughter-
House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 73 (1872)(residents of the District of Colum-
bia); Immigration and Nationality Act § 302, 8 U.S.C. § 1402 (1988)(Puerto Rico);
Id § 306(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1406(b)(Virgin Islands)(citizens of territories).
23. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis supplied).
[Vol. 70:462
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citizens. Some persons are determined to be citizens based upon their
birth in the United States. Others have become citizens through a nat-
uralization process provided for in a statute or treaty, and a third
group are citizens based upon statutes or treaties that have conferred
citizenship status. These groups may be roughly categorized as consti-
tutional (fourteenth amendment) citizens, in that they are entitled to
citizenship as a matter of constitutional law,24 naturalized citizens and
statutory citizens,25 respectively.
Most citizens acquire citizenship at birth. This group includes both
statutory and constitutional citizens. Present law provides that all
persons born in the United States become citizens of the United States
at birth unless, as provided in the fourteenth amendment, they are not
"subject to the jurisdiction thereof."2 6 These are Constitutional citi-
zens. The fourteenth amendment requires that a person be born or
naturalized in the United States and be "subject to jurisdiction
thereof." This clause has been held to exclude, Indians and children of
either "enemies in hostile occupation" or foreign diplomats.27 An is-
sue remains as to whether the exclusion clause also includes children
of undocumented workers or illegal aliens. It is asserted that since the
United States has not given its consent to the presence of illegal aliens,
their children cannot acquire United States citizenship. 28 Individual
intent becomes irrelevant.
Congress has expanded the birthright citizenship category to in-
clude Indians,29 children born abroad to a U.S. citizen,3 0 certain chil-
dren born in United States possessions,3 1 and children of unknown
parentage found in the United States under the age of five.3 2 The citi-
24. I use this classification to describe citizenship acquired at birth when born in the
United States, "subject to its jurisdiction." As discussed below, this term typically
includes naturalized citizens since they are also referred to in the fourteenth
amendment.
25. Naturalization is defined as the conferring of nationality after birth by any
means. Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(23), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(23)
(1988). "Statutory citizens" is a term used to describe citizens who do not acquire
citizenship through birth in the United States or a naturalization process. See,
e.g., P. SCHUCK & R. SMrrH, supra note 15, at 126.
26. Immigration and Nationality Act § 301(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(1988). See infra
notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
27. See id § 301(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) and discussion accompanying notes 116-24.
28. See Schuck & Smith, supra note 15.
29. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 682 (exclusion of children born to
foreign enemies or diplomats based upon law of England and the English colonies
as exceptions to the jus soli principle).
30. Id § 301(c), (d), (e), (g), 8 U.S.C. § 1401(c), (d), (e), (g).
31. Immigration and Naturalization Act § 301(f), 8 U.S.C. § 1401(f).
32. Most residents of United States possessions are nationals but not citizens of the
U.S. Id § 308, 8 U.S.C. § 1408. Persons who are nationals but not citizens are con-
sidered to owe allegiance to the U.S. but do not have all the rights and obligations
that accrue to citizens. Puerto Rico, § 302, 8 U.S.C. § 1402; Canal Zone or Repub-
1991]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
zens who do not fit the constitutional requirements but, who are none-
theless accorded citizenship automatically at birth are "statutory
citizens."
A person may become a naturalized citizen based upon their intent
and a formal application,33 or collectively. Collective naturalization
eliminates the focus on both the individual and intent. Rather, it re-
sults from annexation of new territories, admission to statehood, terri-
torial cession by treaty, or statutory enactment. All persons within a
specified group and meeting certain qualifications become citizens
upon the occurrence of one of these triggering events.3 4
Boyd and Elk illustrate the development of established citizenship
principles as well as provide guidance in resolving some of the issues
yet unresolved in citizenship law. The issues presented in Boyd pro-
vide an opportunity to explore the acquisition of citizenship by natu-
ralization and the effect of parental intent and choice on a child's
citizenship. The Elk decision focused primarily on the issues of birth-
right citizenship and provides opportunity for examination of the cate-
gories of birthright citizenship that have developed, in part because of
Elk.
III. THE NEBRASKA CASES
A. Boyd v. Thayer
With the 1890 election, Governor James Boyd became the first
Democratic Governor elected in Nebraska in thirty years.3 5 Shortly
after he received the democratic nomination in August 1890, the
Omaha Daily Bee reported in Boyd's biographical sketch that he had
come to Omaha in 1856 and engaged in the business of carpentry.
Later he pursued merchandising and the raising of stock. His political
career included positions as county clerk, councilman, Mayor of
Omaha, representative and delegate to the state constitutional conven-
tion. The newspaper gave the following glowing praise of the immi-
grant gubernatorial candidate.
He was also a founder of the Nebraska National Bank, and ten years ago built
the splendid opera house.... Mr. Boyd has always been a staunch democrat
and is one of the best known leaders of that party in the state. He is an un-
compromising anti-prohibitionist.
lic of Panama, § 303, 8 U.S.C. § 1403; Virgin Islands, § 306, 8 U.S.C. § 1406; Guam,
§ 307, 8 U.S.C. § 1407. Immigration and Nationality Act § 302, 8 U.S.C. § 1402
(1988)(Puerto Rico); Id § 303, 8 U.S.C. § 1403 (Canal Zone or Republic of Pan-
ama); Id § 306, 8 U.S.C. § 1406 (Virgin Islands); Id § 307, 8 U.S.C. § 1407 (Guam);
Id § 301(f), 8 U.S.C. § 1401(f)(unknown parentage).
33. See infra note 195.
34. See infra text accompanying note 76.
35. Governor Boyd was actually the first Democratic Governor of the State. All pre-
vious Democrats had been Governors of the Territory of Nebraska.
[Vol. 70:462
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Mr. Boyd is an Irishman, having been born on... September 9, 1934. He
came to America with his father in 1847, settled at Zanesville, 0., and resided
there until the western foyer brought him to Omaha.
3 6
The celebration of Boyd's election and the return of the democratic
party3 7 was soon tainted. There was speculation that John H. Powers,
the People's Independent candidate,38 was about to file a contest to the
election based on alleged irregularities in the counting of votes.3 9
Boyd had won a plurality over Powers by 1144 votes.40 The Republi-
can candidate, L.D. Richards, received 68,878 votes, Powers 70,187, and
Boyd 71,331.
On November 21, 1890, Boyd was officially notified that the elec-
tion was to be contested.41 As expected, the first protest was filed by
candidate John Powers.42 There were allegations that voters in
Omaha had not been allowed to enter polling places and that other
fraudulent conduct had occurred. While there were some allegations
of fraudulent conduct in other parts of the State, most of the contro-
versy centered in Omaha. The largest number of votes were cast in
Douglas county (Omaha) with Boyd receiving over 18,000, Powers 1173
and Richards 6456.43
Powers' filed an affidavit alleging "foreigners" had filed their "first
papers"44 between August 1890 and October 1890 and that the fee for
several of them was paid for by one individual or organization.45 The
36. Omaha Daily Bee, Aug. 15, 1890, at 4, col. 5. See also J. MORTON, 1 ILLUSTRATED
HISTORY OF NEBRAsKA 594-95 (1907).
37. The fireworks displays and other forms of celebration reached beyond the bor-
ders of Nebraska. Iowans joined in the rejoicing. Boies was elected in Iowa. One
celebrating slogan announced Boyd's election as a celebration of "The Four Big
B's," "Boies, Boyd, Bowman, Bryan," referring also to William Jennings Bryan
Omaha Daily Bee, Nov. 11, 1890, at 5, col. 3.
38. The People's Independent Party was also referred to as the Farmers Alliance
Party. The Populist Party grew out of the Farmers Alliance party which devel-
oped in part because of an agrarian crisis in the late 19th Century. See, e.g., J.
HIcKs, THE POPULIST REVOLT: A HISTORY OF THE FARMER'S ALLiANCE AmD THE
PEoPLE's PARTY 95 (1931).
39. See, e.g., Omaha Daily Bee, Nov. 17, 1890, at 8, col. 4.
40. I& Nov. 19, 1890 at 4, col. 1.
41. I& Nov. 21, 1890, at 1, col. 6.
42. I& Dec. 5, 1890, at 7, col. 1.
43. Id-
44. This term could have been used to mean either voter registrations, naturalization
certificates or declarations of intention to become citizens. While some newspaper
accounts described the process as naturalization, declaration of intentions were
required at that time so that "first papers" seems to indicate that the individuals
had taken no previous steps toward becoming citizens. See, ag., id. Dec. 8,1890, at
1, col 1; Omaha Word Herald, Feb. 2, 1892, at 1, col. 2. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 231-34.
45. Omaha Daily Bee, Dec. 8,1890, at 1, col. 1. (One hundred seventy-nine first papers
were filed and 102 paid for by one organization in Hall County); Id Dec. 10, 1890,
at 4, col. 1 (Saline County, seven naturalized).
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implication was that the foreigners were then registered to vote for
the election. Some of those assisting in the registration of the new
voters claimed that the sole purpose of registering them was so that
they would vote against prohibition and not so that they would vote
for or against any particular political party.46
The most serious allegation was not made until one month after
the protest had begun. A Cleveland Ohio newspaper carried a story
on December 12, 1890 that was picked up by the Nebraska newspapers.
The article reported that Governor-elect Boyd's father had filed his
declaration of intention47 to become a citizen in 1849,48 but did not
receive his final citizenship papers until the month of the election, No-
vember 1890.49 The naturalization law in effect at the time50 provided
derivative naturalization for minor children who were under the age
of twenty-one and living in the United States at the time that their
parents were naturalized.5 1 If a parent failed to naturalize before the
child reached the age of majority, the child could only acquire citizen-
ship through their own naturalization proceeding.
The hidden meaning of Powers' affidavit became clearer. If the
allegations were true, the elected Governor would not have been a citi-
zen at the time of the election and Powers, receiving the next highest
number of votes, it was claimed, should be the duly elected Governor.
On December 16, 1890, Governor Boyd presented the issue of his
46. Id Dec. 18, 1890, at 4, col. 1.; Id Dec. 19, 1890, at 3, col. 1. At the time, there was a
common belief that numerous incidents of naturalization fraud occurred
throughout the nation. See infra notes 223-24 and accompanying text.
47. See infra text accompanying notes 231-34.
48. The applicable naturalization laws in existence in 1849, when Governor Boyd's
father filed his declaration of intention, provided that an alien was eligible for
admission to citizenship under the following conditions:
a. Must be a free white person having resided in the United States at
least five years and in the State where admission is sought at least one
year.
b. Be of good moral character and have an attachment to the United
States Constitution.
c. Renouncement of any title of nobility he may have had.
d. Take an oath of allegiance to the United States and of renunciation
of his former allegiance.
e. Have taken an oath at least two years prior to his application for
admission before "a circuit or district court of the United States, or a
district or supreme court of the Territories, or a court of record of any of
the States having common-law jurisdiction."
Uniform Naturalization Act, ch. 28, 2 Stat. 153 (1802)(repealed 1906).
49. Omaha Daily Bee, Dec. 13, 1890, at 1, col. 2.
50. The provision regarding the naturalization of foreign-born minor children was
the same as had been included in the first naturalization law enacted in 1790. See
infra notes 170-72.
51. Uniform Naturalization Act, ch. 28, 2 Stat. 155 (1802)(repealed 1940) stated: "The
children of persons who have been duly naturalized under any law of the United
States... being under the age of 21 years at the time of the naturalization of their
parents, shall, if dwelling in the United States, be considered as citizens thereof."
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citizenship before the federal district court in Nebraska. This action
and the Cleveland Newspaper article were apparently the result of a
post-election visit by Governor Boyd to his father in Zanesville, Ohio
where he learned of the questionable citizenship status. The court is-
sued a judgment that Boyd was in fact a citizen.
The other named party in the Boyd case was Governor John M.
Thayer. He was a Republican from Grand Island, Nebraska, first
elected in 1886 and reelected in 1888.52 Although Thayer challenged
Boyd's right to take over the office of Governor,5 3 Boyd took office on
January 9, 1891. By this time, Governor Thayer had instructed his
lawyer, John L. Webster,5 4 to begin quo warranto proceedings55
against Governor Boyd on the grounds that he was ineligible to be
elected since he was not a citizen at the time of the election and there-
fore should be ousted from the office.5 6
When Boyd appeared at the gubernatorial office, the state militia
including six policemen and a deputy sheriff refused to allow him to
enter. Thayer's refusal to relinquish the customary Governor's
52. A. SHELDON, HISTORY AND STORIES OF NEBRAsKA 272 (1913). A contemporary
account of the election contest and the Supreme Court decision was reported in
the Omaha World Herald, Feb. 2, 1892, at 1 (Sunrise ed.).
53. John M. Thayer had served as the first brigadier general of the Nebraska militia,
which was organized primarily to protect the settlers from the Indians, and also
as Nebraska's U.S. Senator. A. SHELDON, NEBRASKA, THE LAND AND THE PEOPLE
264, 424 (1931). Thayer was born in Massachusetts and spent his early life there.
His family had immigrated to the United States from England three generations
before with the coming of Thomas Thayer, Governor Thayer's great grandfather.
Thayer moved to Nebraska in 1854. He served in the Nebraska territorial council
from Douglas County and in his first week introduced an act to abolish slavery.
Curtis, John Milton Thayer, 28 NEB. HIST. 225 (1947).
54. Webster had served as the President of the Convention that drafted the terri-
tory's constitutional provision regarding qualifications for office. He was de-
scribed as the "prohibition attorney." This was not the first case involving
constitutional rights that Webster had presented to the Supreme Court. He had
served as attorney for John Elk, as well as attorney for Standing Bear in another
famous trial arising in Nebraska involving the rights of the Ponca Indians. See
Lake, Standing Bear! Who?, 60 NEB. L. REV. 451 (1981) for a detailed discussion
of the decision and events surrounding United States ez rel Standing Bear v.
Crook, 25 F. Cas 695 (C.C.D. Neb. 1879)(No. 14,891).
55. NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-21, 146 (1989 & Supp. 1990), in effect since 1858, reads:
When any citizen... shall claim any office... unlawfully held and exer-
cised by another, the person so claiming such office shall have the right
to file.., an information in the nature of a quo warranto, upon his own
relation, and.., to prosecute said information to final judgment; Pro-
vided, he shall have first applied to the prosecuting attorney.... and the
prosecuting attorney shall have refused or neglected to file the ...
[information].
56. The Nebraska Constitution provided in relevant part that "No person shall be
eligible to the office of Governor... [Who shall not have attained to the age of
thirty years, and been for two years next preceding his election a citizen of the
United States and of this State. .. ." NEB. CONST. art. V, § 2.
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quarters, resulted in Boyd having to occupy offices previously held by
the board of transportation. The local papers reported that the Ne-
braska Supreme Court had returned Thayer's quo warranto papers to
Webster and expert attorneys assumed that this meant the supreme
court was refusing to hear the quo warranto action.57 This assumption
was apparently based upon the challenge to Thayer's standing to file
the proceedings.58
This speculation was short-lived when on January 13, 1891, Chief
Justice Cobb announced that the court did have jurisdiction and would
allow the quo warranto proceedings. The court suggested that Thayer
relinquish the gubernatorial office during the pendency of the pro-
ceedings, even though it questioned it's authority to order Thayer to
do so.59 Thayer vacated the gubernatorial offices at the state house
when Governor Boyd's representatives, including the new head of the
state militia, General Vifquain, and State Treasurer Hill presented
him with a legislative resolution that required that the offices and
quarters he occupied be turned over to Governor Boyd.60 Although
Thayer stated at the time he vacated the quarters that he was content
to wait for the decision of the Nebraska Supreme Court, within a few
days he notified Governor Boyd that an injunction was being sought to
prevent Boyd from functioning as Governor. Thayer's affidavit, ac-
companying the notice, alleged that Boyd had wrongfully taken the
offices and rooms from Thayer by force.6 ' A small article appearing in
the Omaha Daily Bee reported that "General Thayer is not a raving
maniac, as has been asserted," and that Thayer was reported as simply
57. Omaha Daily Bee, Jan. 9, 1891, at 1, col. 1.
58. See infra note 65 and accompanying text.
59. Omaha Daily Bee, Jan. 13, 1891, at 1, col. 1.
60. Id Jan. 15, 1891, at 1, col. 3.
61. A copy of the notice served on Boyd was reprinted in the Omaha Daily Bee, Jan.
19, 1891, at 1, col. 5.
Notice to James E. Boyd-You are hereby notified that the relator, John
M. Thayer, will move the court on January 29, 1891, at the capitol, in the
court room of said court, at 9 o'clock in the forenoon of said day, or as
soon thereafter as counsel can be heard, for an injunction to restrain and
enjoin you from exercising or undertaking to exercise the office or duties
of Governor of the state of Nebraska, and from invading, using or occu-
pying the rooms or any of them of the Governor of Nebraska, heretofore,
and until the 15th day of January, 1891, occupied and used by the relator
as Governor of Nebraska, and which you on said 15th day of January
unlawfully and with force invaded and took from the relator; and fur-
ther to restrain you from using or removing from said rooms any of the
furniture or records thereof, and from in any manner hindering or dis-
turbing the relator in the quiet occupancy, use and enjoyment of said
rooms, office, records and furniture pending this suit, and until the final
hearing and judgment herein, or further order of the court; and you are
further notified that the affidavits hereto attached and accompanying
this notice will be read and used at said hearing, and at that time and
place you may be heard to show cause, if any you have, why such injunc-
tion should not be granted.
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resting in bed because he had "overtaxed his strength and was physi-
cally prostrated."62 The Nebraska Supreme Court apparently did not
consider the injunction request on January 29, 1891 as scheduled.63
The court overruled Boyd's motion to dismiss Thayer's complaint.
In his answer to the complaint, Boyd alleged that he was a citizen-he
had lived his life as a citizen and that he had taken an oath of alle-
giance, the same oath required of a person being naturalized, when he
had enlisted in the militia.64 Boyd essentially argued that based upon
his intent to become a citizen and his conduct which was consistent
with his intent, the Court should find that he was a citizen at the time
of the election. Boyd also recounted the actions taken by his father in
furtherance of his intent to make the United States his permanent
residence and to become a citizen as well as the senior Boyd's belief
for forty years that he was a citizen. Further, Boyd recounted, his fa-
ther had told him, when he was twenty-one years old, that he was a
United States citizen. Boyd also claimed, in the alternative, that he
had acquired citizenship when Nebraska was admitted into the Union
as a State. The court found this last argument unpersuasive, after con-
cluding that Congress had not specifically provided for collective natu-
ralization in Nebraska's admission documents and further, Boyd's
assertion would mean that even foreigners who either did not meet
statutory qualifications for naturalization or had no intention of be-
coming citizens would have acquired citizenship.
In response to Thayer's demurrer, requesting a judgment on the
pleadings, the three-judge Nebraska Supreme Court rejected Boyd's
claim that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the case 65 and on the after-
noon of May 5, 1891, announced its decision that Thayer should retain
the Governor's office. In rejecting his claim, the court found that
Boyd was not a citizen at the time of election, and since an ineligible
62. Id
63. Id Jan. 29, 1891, at 1, col. 1.
64. While the action was pending, the head of the State militia, Adjutant General
Vifquain, discovered that Boyd had volunteered and been drafted into the army
in 1864 at Fort Kearney, Nebraska, as one of the settlers needed in an "Indian
campaign." Id Jan. 20, 1891, at 4, col. 1. He believed that the discovery of the
information would help Boyd in his battle to retain office. Governor Boyd had
apparently either forgotten that he had served in the army for a brief period or
failed to recognize the significance of his service.
65. The attorney general refused to challenge Boyd's right to hold the office based
upon his lack of citizenship. It was argued on behalf of Boyd that since Thayer's
term had expired, he did not have the required standing to institute a quo war-
ranto proceeding. Id Mar. 4, 1891, at 1, col. 3.
But see Sorensen v. Swanson, 181 Neb. 205, 147 N.W.2d 620 (1967)(Primary
purpose of Nebraska quo warranto statute is the same as existed at common
law-determination of an occupant to hold an office) (demurrer sustained; an ac-
tion by the occupant of an executive state office to contest the election of his
successor is not an action in quo warranto within the meaning of article V, section
2, of the Constitution of Nebraska but rather an election contest).
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candidate had received a plurality of the votes, the election was void.
Immediately after issuing the two-judge majority opinion, which was
written on behalf of the court by Judge Norval, reported by the
Omaha Daily Bee to be the brother of "Governor Thayer's lawyer,"
the court had a writ of ouster served upon Governor Boyd. Governor
Boyd relinquished the Governor's office to Governor Thayer only
about one hour after the decision was issued.66
In reaction, the Omaha Daily Bee suggested that Thayer and his
lawyers had some advantage in the lawsuit because of their connec-
tions. The author of the decision, Judge T. Norval was the brother of
Richard Norval, Thayer's appointee as Attorney General. In addition,
Boyd's lawyers were not present when the court announced the deci-
sion. The decision was expected on the morning of May 5, 1891 and
when the decision had not been issued by noon, Boyd's lawyers appar-
ently left the courthouse. It was suggested that Boyd's lawyers were
misled into believing that the court would adjourn until the next day.
Therefore, none of Boyd's lawyers arrived at the Governor's office un-
til Boyd already had relinquished the office.6 7 Other reports claimed
the writ of ouster was prepared before the decision was issued and was
immediately enforced by a "posse of about fifty others" including John
L. Webster and Dick Norval accompanied by a deputy sheriff.68
Judge Maxwell, the lone dissenter, complained that Boyd's lawyers
had not been given proper time to file objections and that the writ of
ouster had been "'surreptitiously obtained.' "69 Boyd apparently re-
quested time to call his lawyer before he vacated the office but John
Webster insisted that the deputy sheriff demand immediate possession
of the office.
Boyd's attorney, John D. Howe, announced immediately after the
decision was entered that an appeal would be filed with the United
States Supreme Court70 Governor Boyd stated that he agreed with
Judge Maxwell's dissenting opinion, and that with respect to his
citizenship:
I believe . .. that I am a citizen of the United States, and of course it goes
without saying that I always intended to be such. A man who has lived in this
country since he was a child and been a resident and citizen of this state for
thirty-five years, and who helped to frame the constitutional provision... of
the enabling act under which the state was admitted into the union, and who
has done perhaps as much as any other man in building up and developing the
resources of the state, is certainly entitled to citizenship .... [I]f the law will
so permit I will carry this case to the supreme court of the United States for
the purpose of having a declaration of what constitutes citizenship of the
66. Omaha Daily Bee, May 6, 1891, at 1, col 7.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. May 7, 1891, at 1, col. 5.
70. Id.
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United States by the highest tribunal in the land.71
The law so permitting, he filed a request for review with the
Supreme Court. His review request used essentially the same argu-
ments as presented to the Nebraska Supreme Court. Boyd based his
claim to citizenship on three alternate theories: First, he claimed that
he was a citizen in fact-having acquired citizenship while he was still
a minor through the naturalization of his father. Second, he argued
that the circumstances of his life warranted a conclusion that he was a
citizen. He believed that he was a citizen. It was his intent to be a
citizen. He had voted for many years, held public offices and taken
oaths of his allegiance to the United States. Finally, he argued that the
principal of collective naturalization operated to make him a citizen
when Nebraska was admitted into the Union in 1867. This last argu-
ment, taken to the full extent meant that everyone living in Nebraska
at the time of its admission as a State became a citizen whether they
intended to or not.
With only one dissenter, the United States Supreme Court agreed
that the evidence supported a conclusion that Boyd was a citizen.72
However, the Justices did not agree on the reasons for reaching that
conclusion.
With respect to the issue of whether he was a naturalized individ-
ual based on his father's naturalization, the issue was simple. If Gov-
ernor Boyd's father became a citizen before October 1854, the date
when Governor Boyd reached the age of his majority, then the Gover-
nor was a citizen.
Justices Gray, Harlan and Brown joined Chief Justice Fuller in
holding that the proof offered by Boyd was sufficient for a jury to in-
fer that Governor Boyd's father had become a citizen before October,
1854. Thus, based upon Thayer's demurrer, Governor Boyd was enti-
tled to a judgment concluding that he was a citizen at the time of the
election. In reaching this result, the Justices relied, in part, on the
well-pleaded allegations that Boyd's father had consistently exercised
the right of voting and believed himself to be a citizen. The conclusion
that Boyd had alleged facts sufficient to sustain a demurrer is proba-
bly better explained by the circumstances of the time rather than by
legal analysis. At that time, there was little distinction between the
rights granted to immigrants and those granted to citizens. Under Ne-
braska law, immigrants were eligible to vote if they had filed a decla-
ration of intention to become a citizen. An intent evidenced by the
filing of a form was sufficient to confer a right usually reserved for
71. I May 6, 1891, at 1, col. 7, continued at 7, col. 3 (quoting Governor
Boyd) (emphasis supplied).
72. The decision was apparently issued by an eight judge court which included Chief
Justice Melville W. Fuller, and Justices David Brewer, Henry B. Brown, John M.
Harlan, Horace Gray, Lucius Lamor, Stephen J. Field, and Samuel Blatchford.
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citizens. Additionally, the lax nature in which the naturalization pro-
cess was conducted made it unrealistic to insist upon strict compliance
with naturalization procedures and almost impossible to prove that
naturalization had or had not occurred.73
By deciding that a jury could conclude at least in part, from the
actions of Boyd that he was a citizen,74 the Court essentially approved
the consideration of Boyd's intent as support for his claim to citizen-
ship. His actions evidenced intent to be a citizen even though all for-
malities had not been completed. The conduct evidence could not
have been the sole basis for a conclusion that Boyd was a citizen. For
example, it was common at that time for those declaring intent but not
yet becoming citizens to vote.75
Boyd's second contention, that even if he had not been naturalized,
aliens residing in territories or States at the time of their admission in
the Union became citizens through the process of collective naturali-
zation was accepted, with some clarification, by Chief Justice Fuller,
and Justices Brewer, Blatchford and Lamar. In his opinion, Chief Jus-
tice Fuller noted that there were numerous instances of collective nat-
uralization by Congress under its naturalization powers. Elk was cited
for the proposition that even Indians who were not members of a
political sovereignty had gained citizenship through collective natural-
ization. In accepting Boyd's collective naturalization argument, Chief
Justice Fuller wrote:
Congress having the power to deal with the people of the Territories in
view of the future States to be formed from them, there can be no doubt that
in the admission of a State a collective naturalization may be effected in ac-
cordance with the intention of Congress and the people applying for
admission.
76
The Court then examined the documents involved in the creation
of the State. The Nebraska Legislature petitioned Congress in 1864
for Nebraska statehood. As a result, Congress passed Nebraska's En-
abling Act,7 7 pursuant to which Nebraska adopted a Constitution that
was narrowly approved. 78 Nebraska was admitted into the Union on
73. See J. GAvrr, supra note 10, at 25-33; infra section IV.B.1.
74. It is not known if the court would have reached the same conclusion if there had
not also been some evidence that Boyd's father had acted as though he believed
that he had become naturalized.
75. This privilege generally extended to white males and was restricted on the basis
of race (Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857)), sex (Minor v. Hap-
persett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874)), and property ownership, but not necessar-
ily citizenship (Rosberg, Aliens and Equal Protection: Why Not the Right to
Vote?, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1092, 1093-97 (1977)).
76. Boyd v. Nebraska ez rel. Thayer, 143 U.S. 135, 170 (1892).
77. Act of Apr. 19, 1864, ch. 59, 13 Stat. 47.
78. The vote was 3938 for and 3838 against. Boyd v. Nebraska ex rel Thayer, 143 U.S.
135, 174 (1892). See J. BARRETT, NEBRASKA AND THE NATION 54 (4th ed. 1906)(cit-
ing HISTORY OF NEBRASKA 151 (1882)).
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March 1, 1867 after amending its Constitution, as required by Con-
gress, to eliminate its restriction of suffrage to "free white males."
At the time of Nebraska's admission into the Union, some states
determined eligibility to vote based upon length of residence in the
state. Others, such as Nebraska, based the determination upon citi-
zenship, which included those who had the filed a declaration of inten-
tion to become a citizen. This practice was reflected in the 1854
Organic Law under which the Territory of Nebraska was organized.
This law included in section 5 the requirements for eligibility to hold
office or to vote dictated that a person be (1) a citizen of the United
States or (2) have filed a declaration of intention to become a citizen
and also have taken an oath to support the Constitution of the United
States.79 These requirements were emphasized in section 10 which
provided that:
[Every free white male citizen,] and those who shall have declared on oath
their intention to become such, and shall have taken an oath to support the
Constitution of the United States, [shall be entitled to vote.]80
The Court agreed with the Nebraska Supreme Court that Congress
did not intend to confer citizenship on all newly-arrived aliens who
took up residence in Nebraska before it was admitted into the Union.
Nonetheless, it concluded that these documents reflected an intention
on the part of Congress to recognize as United States citizens, anyone
who was already a citizen living in the territory as well as anyone who
had filed a declaration of intention. But, Governor Boyd had never
filed a declaration of intention nor had he been naturalized in the time
required prior to the election. Justice Fuller, writing for the court,
had to create a theory of citizenship acquisition. He reasoned that
since Governor Boyd was a minor at the time, his father's declaration
of intention conferred upon him an "inchoate status" which had to be
accepted or repudiated upon reaching his majority. Since there was no
evidence that Governor Boyd had made any application of acceptance
prior to the election, the Court concluded that a formal act was not
required. Instead, Governor Boyd's actions, which included serving in
elected offices, taking oaths of allegiance, and serving in the militia,
demonstrated that he had accepted his father's repudiation of his for-
mer nationality and therefore had performed the "actual equivalent"
of a formal application.S' That is, his subjective intent and belief was
to become a citizen and his actions evidenced this intent.
The Supreme Court issued its decision on February 1, 1892 and
Thayer surrendered the Governor's office on February 8, 1892. Boyd
filed the Supreme Court opinion with the Nebraska Clerk of Court on
March 15, 1892 and on the next day a hearing was held. Thayer's ac-
79. Act of May 30, 1854, ch. 59, § 5, 10 Stat. 277, 279.
80. Id. § 10, 10 Stat. 277, 281.
81. Boyd v. Nebraska ex reL Thayer, 143 U.S. 135, 178-79 (1892).
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tion was dismissed with no appearance being made on his behalf. Ap-
parently notice of the hearing had been served on Webster who was no
longer Thayer's attorney. Consequently a motion was filed on
Thayer's behalf to set aside the dismissal.8 2 Thayer contended that
the Supreme Court had merely determined that his demurrer should
have been overruled and that Boyd should be allowed to proceed to
trial and the Court had not resolved the citizenship question. The Ne-
braska Supreme Court determined that the motion was untimely and
noted that the notice had been served in good faith since the change in
attorneys was unknown to either the court or Boyd.8 3 Further, the
court held that it was not required to resolve the question presented
by Thayer since he no longer had authority to pursue the quo war-
ranto proceedings. The court distinguished this conclusion from it's
earlier approval of Thayer's action by finding that when Thayer relin-
quished the office to Boyd, he became a private person who could not
maintain the proceedings. On April 7, 1892, the court issued its opin-
ion and the battle for the State House ended. There were no further
challenges to Governor Boyd's citizenship.
B. Elk v. Wilkins
In deciding whether John Elk, an Indian living in Omaha, was a
citizen, the Supreme Court announced in Elk v. Wilkins84 that the
fourteenth amendment phrase "subject to the jurisdiction thereof,"
was to be interpreted to exclude Indians from becoming citizens of the
United States under the doctrine of jus soli. John Elk's tribal affilia-
tion was not alleged in his petition. The petition simply alleged that
he "is an Indian."85 The Omaha, Otoe, Ponca, Pawnee and Sioux
tribes lived in Nebraska at that time. However, Elk's tribal affiliation
may not have been to a tribe based in Nebraska. The 1880 census
records reveal that John Elk was born in Iowa and that his mother
and father were both from Wisconsin. The census further reported
that he was thirty-five years of age, employed as a laborer, and that he
lived with his wife, Louise, in a "wigwam" along the Missouri land
banks in Omaha in "dwelling no. 282."86 John Elk had severed his tri-
bal relations for at least one year before he attempted to register as a
voter. When he presented himself before Charles Wilkins, an election
official of the Fifth Ward, Wilkins refused to register him. John Elk
subsequently presented himself to vote again and was again refused.
John Elk brought suit in the United States Circuit Court for the
District of Nebraska seeking $6000 in damages. He was represented
82. State ex reL Thayer v. Boyd, 34 Neb. 435, 436, 51 N.W. 964, 964 (1892).
83. I& at 436, 51 N.W. at 964.
84. 112 U.S. 94 (1884).
85. Id- at 95.
86. Douglas County, Nebraska 1880 Census, Dist. 20, Ward 5, p.3 4 .
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by John L. Webster, the lawyer representing Thayer in his opposition
to Governor Boyd's claim to citizenship,8 7 and A.J. Poppleton. Wil-
kins was represented by United States District Attorney G.M. Lam-
bertson,88 one of the first faculty members of the Nebraska Law
College.8 9 A demurrer was filed on behalf of Wilkins, admitting the
following:
[That Elk] is an Indian, and was born in the United States, and has severed his
tribal relation to the Indian tribes, and fully and completely surrendered him-
self to the jurisdiction of the United States, and still continues to be subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States, and is a bonafide resident of the State of
Nebraska and city of Omaha. 9 0
The issue seemed simple-had an Indian who had "assimilated"
and who had the intention of becoming a citizen acquired citizenship
and therefore eligibility to vote.91 The dicta in the Dred Scott majority
opinion indicated that an affirmative response was required. It stated,
"if an individual should leave his nation or tribe, and take up his abode
among the white population, he would be entitled to all the rights and
privileges which would belong to an emigrant from any other foreign
people."92 This statement along with a prior Nebraska case deciding
an Indian Rights issue would seem to warrant a conclusion that Elk
was both a citizen of the United States and Nebraska. One of the cir-
cuit court judges hearing the Elk case, Judge Elmer S. Dundy, had
held in Standing Bear v. Crook that Indians had a right of expatria-
tion-that is, a right to sever their tribal relationships and leave an
established reservation. 93
It was clear that an alien who had expatriated himself from his
original nationality could become a citizen. It would then seem that
87. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
88. After the Elk decision, Lambertson published an article stating his view regard-
ing the case. He agreed with other commentators that not all Indians were ready
for citizenship. He asserted however, that Elk did not reach the question of
whether an Indian who was taxed became a citizen under the fourteenth amend-
ment, suggesting that proof of Elk's taxation might have supported his claim to
citizenship. Lambertson, Indian Citizenship, 20 AM. L. REV. 183, 185 (1886). This
view of the Elk majority was rejected in Justice Harlan's dissent. Elk v. Wilkins,
112 U.S. 94,110-11 (1884)(Harlan & Woods, J.J., dissenting). See infra notes 107-
12, 149-50 and accompanying text.
89. Allen, History of the Organization of the University of Nebraska Law School, 22
NEB. L. REV. 200 (1943). Mr. Lambertson along with the other faculty members
received no pay. He taught Interstate Commerce.
90. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 98 (1884).
91. Much of the opposition to citizenship for Indians was the belief that they had not
assimilated into "civilized life." See generally F. CoHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL
INDIAN LAw 153 (1986 ed).
92. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 404 (1856).
93. See United States ex rel Standing Bear v. Crook, 25 F. Cas. 695 (C.C.D. Neb.
1879)(No. 14,89) Poppleton and Webster had appeared before Judge Dundy with
Lambertson opposing them in Standing Bear. In the first case Poppleton and
Webster prevailed. See supra notes 54, 154-55 and accompanying text.
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an Indian could similarly become a citizen upon expatriating himself
from his tribe and forming the necessary intent. However, in the Ek
circuit court opinion, Judges McCrary along with Judge Dundy sus-
tained Wilkins' general demurrer, dismissing Elk's petition on the ba-
sis that he was not a citizen.
Prior to Elk, the Supreme Court decided two major cases regarding
the status of Indians which were used in support of the Supreme
Court's decision in Elk. In 1831, in the case of Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia,9 4 the Court was presented with the question of whether or
not the Cherokee Nation was a "foreign state" within the meaning of
article III, section 2 of the Constitution which provides for federal ju-
dicial power over controversies between a state and foreign states.95
While this case did not involve a suffrage or citizenship issue directly,
it did lay the groundwork for the Elk decision. In resolving the Chero-
kee Nation jurisdictional question, Chief Justice Marshall character-
ized the Cherokee Tribe as "a state ... a distinct political society...
capable of managing its own affairs and governing itself,"90 and its
members as "in a state of pupilage... [t]heir relation to the United
States resembles that of a ward to his guardian." 97
In the second case, Worcester v. Georgia,98 the question of Indian
sovereignty again arose. In Worcester, white missionaries had settled
on Cherokee land with the permission of the tribe but in violation of
state law. They were convicted by a Georgia state court for residing on
Indian lands without a state license. The missionaries argued that the
federal government had recognized the sovereignty of the Cherokee
Nation through treaties and that state law therefore could not be ap-
plied on Indian land. Again writing for the Court, Chief Justice Mar-
shall reasoned that Georgia's actions interfered with relations
between the United States and the Cherokee Nation and thus violated
superior federal law.99 The Court noted that Indians were not aliens
but were in a rather unique relationship with the United States gov-
ernment. In Cherokee, Chief Justice Marshall had stated that Indian
nations are not foreign nations but "domestic dependent nations."100
Since prior cases had held that Indians were also not aliens even
though they were to be considered "distinct and independent political
communities," 10 the status of the individual Indian based on these
94. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
95. See U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2.
96. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16 (1831).
97. I& at 17.
98. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
99. Id at 560-61.
100. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831). For a summary of the
history of the guardian relation, see F. COHEN, supra note 91, at 169-73.
101. See, e.g., United States v. Osborne, 6 Sawyer 406 (D. Or. 1880).
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cases was arguably that of a citizen granted certain special rights (and
denied certain rights) based upon their tribal relationship.
However, the Elk Court rejected application of an intent theory
and concluded that Indians could not discard their tribal relationship
and become citizens without the consent of the United States govern-
ment through either treaty or statute.1 0 2 Self-determination was
based on tribal rather than individual intent. Of course, a decision
that John Elk was not a citizen meant that he had no suffrage right
protected under the fifteenth amendment. In reaching its conclusion
that Indians were not "subject to the jurisdiction" of the United States
within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment, the Court relied in
part on the fact that Indians are referred to in two clauses of the Con-
stitution. Article I, section 2 excludes "Indians not taxed" from the
calculations for distribution of representatives and direct taxes. Arti-
cle I, section 8 grants Congress the power to regulate commerce with
"Indian tribes," and is the basis for the conclusion that states were
prohibited from taxing Indian lands within their borders. The
Supreme Court reasoned that Indian tribes were separate nations con-
sisting of distinct political communities and therefore Indians, like
children of foreign enemies or diplomats born within the territorial
limits, were not subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and
thus did not acquire citizenship at birth. Further, citizenship could be
bestowed upon Indians only through acts of Congress or treaties made
specifically applicable to Indians since general acts of Congress did not
apply to Indians. Justice Gray, writing for the majority, stated:
Indians born within the territorial limits of the United States, members of,
and owing immediate allegiance to, one of the Indian tribes (an alien, though
dependent, power), although in a geographical sense born in the United
States, are no more 'born in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof,' within the meaning of the first section of the fourteenth amendment,
than the children of subjects of any foreign government born within the do-
main of that government, or the children born within the United States, of
ambassadors or other public ministers of foreign nations.j 03
The Court relied upon the fact that subsequent to the ratification
of the Fourteenth Amendment there were Indian citizens who had
acquired their citizenship pursuant to treaties or statutes that pro-
vided for certain tribes to acquire citizenship.104 The rationale was
102. "General acts of Congress did not apply to Indians, unless so expressed as to
clearly manifest an intention to include them." Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 100
(1884)(citing U.S. CONsT. art. I, §§ 2,8; U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 2; Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515
(1832)).
103. Elk. v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 102 (1884).
104. For example, the Court noted that Winnebago Indians in Minnesota could be-
come citizens in connection with the issuance a fee simple patent for land and
payment of their proportion of tribal money, pursuant to the Act of July 15,1870,
ch. 296, § 10. 1& at 104-05.
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that since Congress had conferred citizenship by statute or treaty, it
could be assumed that citizenship was not already available to Indians
under the Constitution.
The Court concluded that the fourteenth amendment required
that all necessary conditions for birthright citizenship be met at the
time of birth. That is, at the time of birth a person had to be "subject
to the jurisdiction."105 Of course, the Court asserted, Indians were not
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States because they were not
taxed. Thus, Indians could only become citizens through naturaliza-
tion-individual or collective. The Court also noted that there was no
evidence that John Elk was taxed.
Cherokee Nation, Worcester and the constitutional clauses cited by
the Court could have been used to support a tenable argument that
Indians did acquire citizenship pursuant to the fourteenth amend-
ment. Since the practice of recognizing tribes as independent nations
and entering into treaties with the Indians had ended in 1871, it is ar-
guable that Congress concluded Indians were constitutional citizens,
the same as all others born in the United States.106 For some this
would have required acquisition of citizenship through a two-step pro-
cess. First, birth had to occur in the United States. Second, an Indian
had to become subject to the jurisdiction of the United States either
upon expatriation from his tribe or some other event as defined by
Congress. An inquiry into intent and conduct would have been neces-
sary. While this would have presented a variation from the standard
way of acquiring citizenship under the citizenship clause, the Court
had previously announced that Indians held a unique relationship
with the United States. The method for acquiring constitutional citi-
zenship could have been determined to be one more feature of this
unique relationship.
In response to the Court's observation that there was no evidence
that John Elk was taxed, Justice Harlan, in his dissent, argued that it
was possible to construe constitutional restrictions applicable to "Indi-
ans not taxed" to mean Indians not subject to taxation. Therefore, an
Indian that was a resident of a state, such as John Elk, was subject to
taxation "by the laws of the State of which they were residents."107 In
other words, by becoming assimilated into state residency, John Elk
had become subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. Even if
105. A naturalized citizen had to be "subject to the jurisdiction thereof" at the time of
naturalization.
106. A dispute between the House of Representatives and Senate resulted in an ab-
rupt halt to treaty-making. The Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544, 566 pro-
vided "[t]hat hereafter no Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the
United States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation,
tribe, or power with whom the United States may contract by treaty."
107. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 112 (1884)(Harlan & Woods, J.J., dissenting).
[Vol. 70:462
CITIZENSHIP LAW
his tribe had not sought citizenship, he had individually intended to
acquire citizenship and his conduct supported such intent.
Congress had passed the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which provided
that "all persons born in the United States and not subject to any for-
eign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be
citizens of the United States."108 The Court only referred to this stat-
ute in a cursory manner as the predecessor to the fourteenth amend-
ment, rejecting any argument that Indians had acquired citizenship
pursuant to the 1866 Act. The Court saw no reason for having subse-
quently entered treaties with Indian tribes which included a grant of
collective naturalization if Indians had acquired citizenship in 1866.
The possibility of superfluous legislation was rejected as was Justice
Harlan's construction of the statute to confer citizenship upon Indians
who were subject to taxation. In the majority's view, the fourteenth
amendment retained this exclusion, and made no provision for a two-
step process-jurisdiction and birth had to occur simultaneously.
Justice Harlan reasoned that the 1866 Act conferred citizenship
upon Indians who were no longer in tribal relations. Thus, any Indian
subject to taxation was subject to jurisdiction and therefore a citizen.
There was ample support in legislative history to support Harlan's in-
terpretation. As observed in his dissent, Senator Trumbull of Illinois
clarified the reason for including the language "excluding Indians not
taxed": "[T]his amendment ... brings in even the Indian when he
shall have cast off his wild habits and submitted to the laws of organ-
ized society and become a citizen."'109 Even clearer, he noted, was
President Andrew Johnson's interpretation of the law as he voiced his
disagreement and vetoed the Act: "This provision comprehends the
Chinese of the Pacific States, Indians subject to taxation, the people
called Gypsies, as well as the entire race designated as blacks ....
Every individual of those races, born in the United States, is by the bill
made a citizen of the United States."" 0
If the Court had adopted Harlan's dissent, it could have easily rec-
onciled its conclusion with it's prior decisions as well as Standing
Bear. John Elk's act of leaving his tribe could be viewed as a volun-
tary expatriation which required assimilation rather than naturaliza-
tion since his tribal relationship did not make him alien but rather
placed him in this two-step citizenship category.
108. Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1 (1988)), repealed by
Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, § 504, 54 Stat. 1137, 1172.
109. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94,114 (1884)(quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
528 (1866)(remarks of Sen. Trumbull)). This congressional discussion also in-
volved the question of whether citizenship for the Indians required property own-
ership rather than simply being assimilated.
110. Id. at 114 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1679 (1866)(President John-
son's veto message)). Congress overrode a presidential veto for the first time to
pass the 1866 Act.
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The Court did not inquire as to the citizenship status of Elk's par-
ents. The assumption was apparently made that the inquiry was irrel-
evant since John Elk's tribe and therefore his parents were named
neither in a treaty nor a statute. By analogy to Boyd, the Court could
have found that if John Elk's parents had left the tribe before John's
birth, he had an "inchoate status" and therefore acquired citizenship
through his parent's assimilation.
The Elk decision echoed the views of some'll but was denounced
by others because it placed Indians in a separate status. Justice
Harlan voiced his dissatisfaction with the majority's treatment of John
Elk:
If he did not acquire national citizenship on abandoning his tribe and becom-
ing, by residence in one of the States, subject to the complete jurisdiction of
the United States, then the Fourteenth Amendment has wholly failed to ac-
complish, in respect of the Indian race, what, we think, was intended by it; and
there is still in this country a despised and rejected class of persons, with no
nationality whatever;, who, born in our territory, owing no allegiance to any
foreign power, and subject, as residents of the States, to all the burdens of
government, are yet not members of any political community nor entitled to
any of the rights, privileges, or immunities of citizens of the United States.1 1 2
Since the majority found no clear intent by Congress to apply
either the fourteenth amendment or the 1866 Civil Rights Act to In-
dian citizenship questions. John Elk was not a citizen and therefore
could not vote.
It was not until 1924 that Congress passed an Act conferring
United States citizenship on all Indians born within the territorial lim-
its of the United States."13
The Elk decision is evidence that the fourteenth amendment is in-
terpreted as "a constitutional testimony of the separate status of In-
dian[s."114 More important for this discussion, the decision remains
relevant to the continuing question of who has a claim to birth-right
citizenship and the role that intent should play in resolving that ques-
tion. Given the broad interpretation in Elk, the fourteenth amend-
ment phrase "subject to the jurisdiction thereof," retains operative
power to exclude certain persons born in the United States."35
111. See supra note 88. See also Canfield, The Legal Position of the Indian, 15 AM. L.
REv. 21 (1881)(expressing the view that Indians were not ready for citizenship).
112. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 122-23 (1884)(Harlan & Woods, J.J., dissenting).
113. Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253. See infra notes 166-67 and accompanying
text.
114. Newton, Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132 U.
PA. L. REv. 195, 239 (1984).
115. Schuck and Smith use such an argument to support their position that children of
illegal aliens born in the United States should not be considered birth-right citi-
zens pursuant to the fourteenth amendment. See P. SCHUCK & R. SMITH, supra
note 15, at 116-22.
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IV. AN EXAMINATION OF INTENT IN THE DEVELOPMENT
OF CITIZENSHIP LAW AS INFLUENCED BY ELK
AND BOYD
With Elk and Boyd, the Nebraska social scene contributed to the
early understanding of the law of citizenship. As these cases reach
their centennial, the issues both explicit and implicit in the two cases
define and illuminate current issues of citizenship that continue to
arise and perplex the courts and policy makers. The tension between
jus soli and jus sanguinis theories of citizenship played a role in fash-
ioning the dispute in both cases and this tension remains unresolved in
some areas. For example, although the setting and environment has
changed, Governor Boyd's assertion of citizenship through his father's
intention of becoming a citizen, even with the development of the
elaborate statutory and regulatory system that now exists, is relevant
to the resolution of difficult determinations of citizenship based upon
parental actions. And the constitutional phrase "subject to the juris-
diction thereof," so critical to the exclusion of John Elk from the vot-
ing booth, is central to the current issue facing children born in the
United States to nonimmigrant and illegal alien parents as well as the
unique relationship established between Native Americans and the
Constitution.
In the remainder of this Article, I focus on a number of issues of
contemporary interest relating to the determination of a person's citi-
zenship to show how the Elk and Boyd decisions have influenced the
resolution of some issues and still permeate the issues that remain to
be resolved. In addition, I offer my own approach to how a just society
should properly approach some of these issues.
A. Intent as a Determinant of Citizenship
Intent remains as a contemporary concern testing the limits of citi-
zenship law as to what relevance an individual's intent or parental in-
tent should have in determining citizenship. This question arises in
the acquisition of citizenship by either birthright or naturalization as
well as the loss of citizenship. The citizenship of John Elk's and Gov-
ernor Boyd's parents was relevant to the Supreme Court's resolution
of both cases.
1. Acquisition at Birth
John Elk, although born in the United States, could not acquire
citizenship at birth because his parents were not members of a tribe
that had been granted citizenship by Congress. Thus, parental as well
as individual intent were irrelevant in Elk. The Court found it unnec-
essary to consider anything other than the existence or non-existence
of a statute or treaty conferring citizenship on John's Elk's tribe. Self-
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determination was possible for a tribe not not an individual. His citi-
zenship was a matter of group rather than individual rights. This re-
jection of individual intent in Elk has had an extensive effect on all
aspects of Native American law.
In Elk, the Court was required to determine under what circum-
stances a child born in the United States acquired United States citi-
zenship. In the Court's first interpretation of the fourteenth
amendment, it stated that "[t]he phrase, 'subject to its jurisdiction' was
intended to exclude from its operation children of ministers, consuls,
and citizens or subjects of foreign states born within the United
States."1 16 While the legislative history of the fourteenth amendment
made it clear that blacks were to be considered constitutional citizens,
its application to certain other groups was less clear. Justice Miller's
dictum in the Slaughter-House Cases that "[t]he phrase was intended
to exclude children of ... citizens or subjects of foreign states born
within the United States,"117 led to early questions as to whether two
controversial groups, (1) Indians, and (2) children born in the United
States of alien parents, some of whom were ineligible for naturaliza-
tion,11 8 could acquire U.S. citizenship. It was assumed that these two
groups had no intent to form an allegiance to the United States. As
described above,11 9 when faced with this controversy with respect to
Indians, the Supreme Court concluded that Indians born in the United
States did not acquire citizenship pursuant to the fourteenth amend-
ment.120 Strict application of the phrase required that no considera-
tion be given to whether or not John Elk's parents intended to become
citizens. Therefore, they were not "Fourteenth-Amendment-first-sen-
tence citizen[s]." 12 1 At this point then, it seemed that the statements
from the Slaughter-House Cases required a conclusion that a child
born in the United States did not acquire citizenship unless the par-
ents were United States citizens, or at least eligible to become citizens.
Elk adopted the restrictive view that a distinction could be made be-
tween births occurring in the United States to determine who would
acquire citizenship.
The restrictive interpretation of the fourteenth amendment's ex-
clusion clause was not applied to aliens. In United States v. Wong
116. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 73 (1872)(dictum).
117. 1&
118. See generally L. GErYs, THE LAW OF CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 17-23
(1934).
119. See supra text accompanying notes 102-05.
120. See infra text accompanying notes 253-54.
121. This phrase was used by Justice Blackmun in Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815, 827
(1971), to describe individuals who acquire citizenship at birth because of their
birth in the United States. See section IV.C. for a discussion of implications of
this conclusion on the acquisition of citizenship by other statutory citizens.
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Kim Ark,122 the Supreme Court held that a Chinese person born in
the United States was a citizen even if his parents were alien residents
who because of their race could not become naturalized citizens.12 3
Thus, it was determined early after adoption of the fourteenth amend-
ment, that citizenship of parents was not necessary for a child to ac-
quire citizenship at birth in the U.S. Here, the subjective intent
element was provided by the parental permanent residence status. In
contrast to this decision, Elk, placed the Native American in a position
where a child's citizenship depended entirely upon the parent's objec-
tive right to obtain citizenship commensurate with the provisions of a
treaty or statute. In its 1924 report to Congress, the Committee on
Indian Affairs summarized the different ways by which Indians might
become citizens. They included citizenship by birth only if the child is
born to citizen Indian parents or born in a legitimate marriage to an
Indian woman and a white citizen father.'2 4 The subjective intent of
an Indian child's parents was irrelevant.
It is now generally accepted that in addition to individuals born to
parents who have been granted permission to remain in the United
States permanently,123 born in the United States126 "subject to the ju-
risdiction thereof" includes individuals born to parents: (1) who are
passing through the United States, (2) allowed to remain in the United
States temporarily while an extraordinary condition exists in their
country of nationality, (3) granted a temporary status to remain here
as visitors, obtain medical treatment, attend school, attend a confer-
ence or work, (4) granted refugee status, but not yet status of a perma-
nent resident, and (5) even to children born to parents on vessels
belonging to the United States government in foreign waters.127 Chil-
122. 169 U.S. 649 (1898).
123. It was not until 1943 that Chinese became eligible for naturalization. The Chinese
Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126,22 Stat. 58, repealed by Act of Dec. 17,1943, ch. 344,
57 Stat. 600 (making Chinese eligible for naturalization and also allowing a small
number of Chinese to immigrate annually).
124. H.R. REP. No. 222, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924).
125. Persons in this category are generally referred to as resident aliens or lawful
permanent residents. This status is conferred on aliens who are permitted to re-
side in the U.S. on a permanent basis. See Immigration and Nationality Act §
101(a)(20), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20)(1988).
126. The "United States" is defined in the Immigration and Nationality Act to in-
clude," when used in a geographical sense .... the continental United States,
Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands." Id. § 101(a)(38), 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(38)(1988).
127. "In the United States" is another phrase contained in the fourteenth amendment
that has caused some problems of interpretation. Statutes have been enacted to
resolve early questions regarding whether individuals born in previously disputed
boundaries such as territories or territorial waters are citizens. See L. GETTYS,
supra note 118, at 16-17. It is generally accepted that birth on a vessel owned by a
U.S. citizen or corporation outside of U.S. territorial waters does not confer citi-
zenship and birth on a foreign vessel in U.S. territorial waters or on an airplane
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dren may also acquire citizenship at birth if they are born outside of
the United States to a parent who is a United States citizen. 28
The debate as to the acquisition of citizenship by children born to
aliens has been revived with respect to illegal aliens. Some commenta-
tors took the position early in our history, prior to the adoption of the
fourteenth amendment, as well as subsequently, that a child born in
the United States should acquire United States citizenship only if the
parent(s) of the child was either a citizen or permanent resident of the
United States.' 2 9 If the desired objective was to grant citizenshp only
to individuals that had the necessary parental or individual intent in
those cases, it was clear that the parents had an intent to participate in
the political community of the United States.
The presence of a large number of illegal immigrants has prompted
some to again raise these issues. Should a child born to a parent who
has no legal status in the United States acquire citizenship? Peter
Schuck and Roger Smith suggest that since the government has not
given consent to the parents to enter or remain in the United States,
their children, although born in the United States would not acquire
U.S. citizenship. It is argued that the exclusion of Indians from four-
over U.S. territory does confer citizenship. 8 Foreign Affairs Manual, U.S. Dep't
of State, § 212.4.
The U.S.S. Saipan, a navy vessel was assisting in the evacuation of individuals
from Liberia in the 1990 uprising. It was reported in a Naval publication, Wilde,
It's a Girl!, 884 ALL HANDs 46, 46 (1990), that a child born to a Lebanese citizen
on board ship acquired United States citizenship as well as the Lebanese citizen-
ship of the parents. This is a reasonable construction of "in the United States" if a
vessel operated by the United States government is considered to be within the
"geographical limits" of the United States. Similar reasoning should apply, how-
ever, to birth of a non-citizen's child in a U.S. embassy. An argument against this
construction can be based on the enactment of Immigration and Nationality Act
§ 330, 8 U.S.C. § 1441 (1988), which provides that service on a U.S. operated vessel
by a lawful permanent resident is considered "constructive residence" for deter-
mining naturalization eligibility. It would seem that this statute would be unnec-
essary if a U.S. operated vessel is "in the United States."
128. This form of citizenship acquisition is included within the category of statutory
citizenship discussed infra in text accompanying notes 251-55.
129. Here is how one writer described a consequence of the Slaughter-House Cases as
it related to a child born in the United States whose father was a citizen or subject
of a foreign government:
Now it is obvious that such child would be subject to a foreign power, to
wit, the country of his father, which of course would exclude him from
being subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
In conclusion... 'the phrase... was intended to exclude... children
of... citizens or subjects of foreign States born within the United States.'
Collins, Are Persons Born Within the United States Ipso Facto Citizens Thereof,
18 AM. L. REV. 831, 837 (1884). See also L. GETrYS, supra note 118, at 17-19 (dis-
cussion of the effect of the Slaughter-House Cases on the subsequent Supreme
Court ruling in United States v. Wong Kim Ark); P. SCHUCK & R. SMITH, supra
note 15.
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teenth amendment citizenship in Elk supports such a view. 3 0 That is,
just as Indians were construed not to be "subject to the jurisdiction" of
the U.S., illegal aliens should also be considered in the same status and
such status would attach to their children. The same conclusion could
be reached by focusing on parental intent. Since the parents are in the
U.S. illegally, they could have no realistic intent to acquire citizenship
for their child since they have not complied with the necessary prereq-
uisites for entering the country.
A strict interpretation of the fourteenth amendment soon after its
ratification, led to the conclusion that "Congress has seen fit to con-
fine the privilege of becoming an American citizen to the Caucasian
and African races."131 The congressional debates on the fourteenth
amendment make it clear that there was no universal agreement on
the meaning of the amendment's language. Some considered the lan-
guage as encompassing only whites and blacks; others read it to also
include Chinese since there could be no restriction by race, but not to
include Indians because of their special situation; and others consid-
ered the language to include Indians if they had separated from their
tribes.132 Adoption of this latter view by the Elk Court would have
allowed an intent consideration. The refusal to consider intent as an
element in Elk has resulted in exclusion of Indians from the category
of constitutional citizens. This restrictive interpretation of the four-
teenth amendment in Elk7 has also contributed to the creation of dis-
tinctions between citizens, creating a situation that does not support
the objective of a cohesive nation. Federal Indian law has developed
around the pronouncement in Elk that Indians do not acquire citizen-
ship pursuant to the fourteenth amendment and that general laws do
not apply to Indians.13 3 While later cases have held that such laws do
apply to Indians,34 the issue continues to be debated.135 The Court's
130. See P. ScHucK & R. SmITH, supra note 15, at 97.
131. Collins, supra note 128, at 835.
132. For a summary of the various positions taken in opposition to the fourteenth
amendment and its presumed purposes and intentions, see generally W. NELSON,
THE FOURTEENTH AmNDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOC-
TRINE (1988).
133. See, e.g, Federal Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99
(1960)(citing Elk in support of its position that the Federal Power Act did not
authorize the Commission to take lands from Indians since general laws did not
apply to Indians unless specifically included); Colliflower v. Garland, 342 F.2d 369
(9th Cir. 1965)( Mrs. Colliflower, an Indian, challenged the validity of a sentence
pronounced by an Indian court. The Court held that constitutional restrictions
applied to the Tribal Court notwithstanding the announcement in Elk that Indi-
ans living on a reservation were not citizens).
134. See, e.g., Navajo Tribe v. National Labor Relations Board, 288 F.2d 162, 164 (D.C.
Cir. 1961), cert denied, 366 U.S. 928 (1961). See also Comment, Archeological
Preservation on Indian Lands: Conflicts and Dilemmas in Applying the Na-
tional Historic Preservation Act, 15 ENvTL. L. 413, 441 (1985)(suggests the Na-
tional Historic Preservation Act applies in its entirety to Indian lands).
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broad statement in Elk that general federal laws did not apply to Indi-
ans unless Congress expressly included them,136 has been extended to
all types of federal and state law.137
The subjective intent of parents continues as an important deter-
minant of citizenship. For example, the question of intent is relevant
to the determination of citizenship of children born out of wedlock
and outside of the United States to fathers who are U.S. citizens. The
debate here involves the subjective intent of the father as it relates to
creating a relationship to the child. In 1986, Congress included a pro-
vision in the Immigration and Nationality Act to broaden the category
of individuals that would acquire citizenship at birth by including chil-
dren born outside of the U.S., out of wedlock, to American citizen
fathers. 3s
Primarily because of the Court's refusal to consider intent, Elk re-
mains as the only decision placing a restriction on birth-right citizen-
ship based upon the citizenship or nationality of the parent. All
generally accepted inclusions within the phrase "subject to the juris-
diction thereof," are based on principles of international law except
the exclusion of Native Americans from constitutional citizenship.139
The Native American continues in a special relationship with the
country, not an alien, but not a fourteenth amendment citizen.
Prior to Elk, the cases holding that Indians were not citizens did
not present a factual situation as compelling as that of John Elk. In
United States v. Shanks,140 the Chief of the Chippewas held land and
"adopted ways of civilized life" yet he was not considered a citizen for
the purpose of resolving his estate in state court. An Indian who had
left his reservation and lived with a white family for ten years as a
135. See e.g., Note, Recognition of Tribal Decisions in State Courts, 37 STAN. L. REV.
1397, 1414 n.99 (1985)(discussing Ragsdale, Problems in the Application of Full
Faith and Credit for Indian Tribes, 7 N.M.L. REv. 133, 140-41 (1977)). It suggests
that Ragsdale's argument is erroneous.
Elk v. Wilkins is no longer in force because later cases have held that
'generally applicable' laws apply to tribes even if they do not mention
Indians. For example, worker's compensation laws define employer and
employee without any reference to Indians, but have been held to apply
to tribes. But this sort of statute is far different from statutes defining
courts' status and power, where one would expect Congress to specifi-
cally mention all courts to which the statutes apply.
Id. at 1414 n.99 (citation omitted).
136. See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
137. However, the fourteenth amendment is construed to provide equal protection to
Indians and to establish them as citizens of the states of their residence. See Clin-
ton, Isolated in Their Own Country: A Defense of Federal Protection of Indian
Autonomy and Self-Government, 33 STAN. L. REv. 979, 1016-17 (1981).
138. Immigration and Nationality Act § 309, 8 U.S.C. § 1409, amended by Pub. L. No.
99-653, § 13, 100 Stat. 3655, 3657 (1986).
139. See supra text accompanying notes 116-22.
140. 15 Minn. 369, 15 Gil. 302 (1870).
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domestic was determined not to be a citizen or voter in United States
v. Osborne.141 The exclusion of John Elk from citizenship has been
described as "[o]ne of the most extreme cases." John Elk had not only
separated himself from his tribe, but had also become a resident of
Nebraska and "completely surrendered himself to the jurisdiction of
the United States."'142 Under the Elk Court's reasoning, even the chil-
dren of Indians who had been granted citizenship by a treaty were not
citizens by virtue of their birth in the United States pursuant to the
fourteenth amendment, but also had to base their claim for citizenship
on the relevant treaty.
Senator George H. Williams of Oregon, among others, believed that
the fourteenth amendment should be construed to exclude only "Indi-
ans who maintain their tribal relations and who are not in all respects
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States."'143 This construction
would have resulted in a determination that John Elk was a citizen.
John Elk had the intent to abandon his tribal relations and his con-
duct was consistent with his intent. Since Congress attempted to con-
fer citizenship in the Civil Rights Act of 1866, it is even possible that
some Indians were considered to have had citizenship bestowed upon
them under the provisions of that Act only to later be told that it was
essentially revoked by ratification of the fourteenth amendment.144
Take a hypothetical case, where a member of a tribe that had not en-
tered into a treaty which conferred citizenship decided to leave the
tribe sometime prior to 1866 and establish residence in a populated
community. If he had taken further actions showing that he had "as-
similated," such as obtaining work and having a family, he might have
presented himself to vote and been granted that right and continued
to vote on the basis that he was a citizen of the United States. Then,
when Elk is decided he is told that he is no longer to be considered a
citizen and therefore not eligible to vote.
Arguably, the Supreme Court felt compelled to ignore individual
intent and limit the extension of citizenship to Indians as a response to
assimilationists as well as a fear expressed by some that large numbers
of Indians could become citizens and control political power.145 These
fears had been addressed to some extent by treaties that placed re-
strictions on Indians. In 1871, Congress passed a bill stating in part
that no additional treaties were to be made with the Indians.
146
Therefore, treaty limitations on Indian participation in the political
141. 6 Sawyer 406 (D.Or. 1880).
142. H.R. Doc. No. 326, 59th Cong., 2d Sess. 57 (1906)(quoting Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S.
94, 98 (1884)).
143. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2897 (1866).
144. See supra text accompanying notes 102-05.
145. See AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY, supra note 5, at 106-16.
146. Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, § 1, 16 Stat. 566 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 71
(1988)).
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process was not available by the time Elk was decided. Exclusion from
the political process could only occur by a determination that Indians
were not citizens and therefore did not have suffrage rights.
The Elk case could have been avoided entirely. If Nebraska had
decided to grant state citizenship or at least the right to vote to Indians
that had in fact become Nebraska residents, as they had done with
aliens who had filed a declaration of intention, John Elk would have
been allowed to vote. At the time, Wisconsin included a provision in
its State constitution that an Indian who had abandoned his tribe and
adopted civilized methods and habits was a citizen of Wisconsin.147
The Court in Elk expressly refused to consider this possibility when it
stated:
Upon the question whether any action of a State can confer rights of citi-
zenship on Indians of a tribe still recognized by the United States as retaining
its tribal existence, we need not, and do not, express an opinion, because the
State of Nebraska is not shown to have taken any action affecting the condi-
tion of this plaintiff. 14 8
The Nebraska Constitution limited the right of suffrage to United
States citizens and aliens having filed the declaration of intention, and
contained no reference to Indians.
In his article written after the Elk decision, U.S. District Attorney
Lambertson, the attorney opposing John Elk, suggested that since the
right to vote and most constitutional rights and privileges guaranteed
to citizens were also extended to non-citizens, it was not necessary to
grant citizenship to Indians in order for a state to grant the right of
suffrage. He noted that although citizenship is generally a prerequi-
site to voting, the right to vote and citizenship were not always coter-
minous.149 This view was persuasive since many states had extended
the right to vote to non-citizens and women, who were citizens but did
not have suffrage rights. In addition, Lambertson stated that,
"[p]robably the solution of the Indian problem will only be attained by
the destruction of the Indians as tribes, and their absorption into our
civilization and citizenship. [C]itizenship should be regarded as an
end, not a means."150
John Elk possibly acquired the right to vote as well as citizenship
four years later. The Elk decision led Congress to take action to add a
citizenship provision in a land allotment bill to "clearly manifest an
intention to include [Indians adopting civilized life]" in the political
community. 151 The General Allotment Act (Dawes Act) of 1887, pro-
vided that land would be allotted to certain Indians. In addition, each
147. See Helgers v. Quinney, 51 Wis. 62, 8 N.W. 17 (1881).
148. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 109 (1884).
149. Lambertson, supra note 88, at 186.
150. Id.
151. In Elk the Court rejected inclusion of Indians in the fourteenth amendment citi-
zenship clause because "[gleneral acts of Congress did not apply to Indians, unless
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individual receiving the allotment was "hereby declared to be a citizen
of the United States."152 By accepting the allotment they became "In-
dians taxed," satisfying the Supreme Court's requirement that Indians
must be taxed to be subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
The individual intent, exhibited by the acceptance of land, now con-
trolled acquisition of citizenship.
Senator Dawes of Massachusetts introduced the legislation. He
had become actively involved in attempts to obtain rights for Indians
after the Ponca Indians in Nebraska had been removed from their tri-
bal lands in violation of a treaty.153 The Nebraska case, United States
ex rel. Standing Bear v. Crook,5 arose out of that incident.-55 The
inclusion of a citizenship provision in the Dawes Act'5 is attributed in
part to the actions of two persons from Nebraska. One, of course, was
John Elk who had been told by the Supreme Court that he was not a
citizen. Senator Dawes viewed the decision as vile, similar to the Dred
Scott disenfranchisement of the black man. The second person was
Bright Eyes (Inshtatheamba), the daughter of Omaha Chief, Iron
Eye.15 7 In 1881, she married Thomas Tibbles, an Omaha newspaper-
so expressed as to clearly manifest an intention to include them." 112 U.S. 94,
100.
152. The Dawes Act provided:
And every Indian born within the territorial limits of the United States
to whom allotments shall have been made ... and every Indian born
within the territorial limits of the United States who has voluntarily
taken up, within said limits, his residence separate and apart from any
tribe of Indians therein, and has adopted the habits of civilized life, is
hereby declared to be a citizen of the United States, and is entitled to all
the rights, privileges, and immunities of such citizens... without in any
manner impairing or otherwise affecting the right of any such Indian to
tribal or other property.
Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, § 6, 24 Stat. 388, 390 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1401(b)(1988)).
The primary purpose of this law was to assimilate Indians into "civilized life."
This was to be accomplished by allotting lands in severalty which were then held
by tribes, to individual members of tribes. Each member of a tribe was allotted a
fixed number of acres.
153. See Lake, supra note 54, for a thorough discussion of the Ponca incident.
154. 25 F. Cas. 695 (C.C.D. Neb. 1879)(No. 14,891).
155. Standing Bear and some other Ponca Indians left the reservation which they had
been removed to after the treaty violation. Upon their return to the area, they
began living with some members of the Omaha tribe. When Brigadier General
Crook arrested and returned them to Fort Omaha, Nebraska, a writ of habeas
corpus was issued on their behalf. Judge Dundy granted the writ. At the conclu-
sion of the trial he held that an Indian could withdraw from his tribe and sever
his tribal relationship, recognizing that Indians had a right of expatriation from
their tribe.
156. The Commissioner of Indian Affairs was opposed to the citizenship clause. He
supported the grant of citizenship but only under some formalized individual nat-
uralization process. See COMM'N OF INDIAN AFF., 1885 ANN. REP. at vi-viii.
157. Bright Eyes was also known as Susette La Flesche, the name she usually used
and preferred. Her father was Joseph La Flesche. The La Flesche family is de-
1991]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
man 5 8 who had been involved in the reporting of the Ponca tribe inci-
dent. She, like others distressed by Elk, wrote to Senator Dawes: "I
see that the Supreme Court has decided that the Indian is not a citi-
zen. What can be done about it? Would a bill have to be brought in
Congress making the Indians citizens?"159
Congress gradually began to further extend citizenship to individ-
ual Indians. In 1888, Indian women who married citizens of the
United States could also gain citizenship.160 While the Dawes Act pro-
vided for the conferring of citizenship on Indians after the fulfillment
of certain conditions, it was not until thirty years later that Indians
were determined to be citizens from birth.161 The emphasis placed
upon adopting a "civilized life" continued until 1924 and is illustrated
by decisions that concluded the children of an Indian mother and a
citizen would not be considered citizens if the father adopted the In-
dian laws by virtue of the family residing with Indians. This was true
even if the mother had at one time lived in a "civilized community."162
Curiously, the father was determined to retain his United States citi-
zenship but not able to confer it upon his children. Again, with re-
spect to questions of Native American citizenship the intent of the
parent was not a relevant factor.
Commentators have described the treatment of Indian citizenship
during the late 1800s and early 1900s as the era of allotments and as-
similation,163 which was based upon the idea that citizenship was not
compatible with a continued allegiance to a tribe. Indians were even
prohibited from rejoining their tribes if they had acquired citizen-
ship.164 Some whites as well as Indians, resisted this assimilationist
scribed in Lake, supra note 54, at 480 n.84, as being "very important in the history
of the Omaha Tribe." One of her relatives, Frank La Flesche, along with Alice
Fletcher of Boston wrote a history of the Omaha tribe and studied with Rev.
William Hamilton, a Presbyterian missionary, at the Omaha Mission. A. SHEL-
DON, supra note 53, at 206.
158. See Lake, supra note 54, at 480 n.84.
159. W. WASHBURN, THE ASSAULT ON INDIAN TRIBALISM: THE GENERAL ALLOTMENT
LAw (DAwES ACr) OF 1887, at 23 (1975) (quoting a letter from Bright Eyes to
Henry L. Dawes, Nov. 12, 1884, Dawes Papers, General Correspondence, Box 25).
See L. PRIEST, UNCLE SAM'S STEPCHILDREN: THE REFORMATION OF UNITED
STATES INDIAN POLICY, 1865-1887, at 244 (1942).
160. Act of Aug. 9, 1888, ch. 818, § 2, 25 Stat 392 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 182 (1988)).
161. General citizenship was granted by the Indian Citizenship Act of June 2, 1924, ch.
233, 43 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b)(1988)).
162. See, e.g., United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567 (1846); H.R. DOC. No. 326,
supra note 142, at 59.
163. See F. COHEN, supra note 91, at 142-43.
164. E.g., Treaty with the Senecas, Mixed Senecas and Shawnees, Quapaws, Confeder-
ated Peorias, Kaskaskias, Weas, and Piankeshaws, Ottawas, and certain Wyan-
dottes, Feb. 23, 1867, arts. 13, 17, 28, 34, 15 Stat. 513, 516-22. The Treaty with the
Quapaws and Wyandottes forbad tribal membership to Wyandottes who had con-
sented to become citizens under a prior treaty unless they were found "unfit to
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view since acquisition of citizenship was viewed as an undesirable ter-
mination of tribal rights.165 John Elk, however, seemed to have met
the required goal of assimilation, yet, he was not treated as an individ-
ual in the resolution of his claim to citizenship. In its recommendation
to Congress, to pass the Citizenship Act of 1924, the Committee on
Indian Affairs concluded that since some Indians had been granted
citizenship "it was only just and fair that all Indians be declared citi-
zens."166 However, even after passage of the 1924 Act, some states at-
tempted to exclude Indians from voting by using the "Indians not
taxed" clause as an exclusion from voting eligibility.167
By construing the fourteenth amendment as excluding Native
Americans from birth-right citizenship the Supreme Court rejected
individual Indian intent to become a citizen. The Court determined
that any action to make Indians citizens would have to be taken by
Congress. Congressional reaction to Elk was to first attempt to in-
clude some aspect of individual intent into citizenship acquisition by
requiring that Indians demonstrate their individual assimilation. Sub-
sequent action granting statutory citizenship to all Native Americans
may be equally unsatisfactory since individual intent again became ir-
relevant and some Native Americans would elect to maintain tribal
relations in lieu of citizenship. 68 The distinctive treatment of Indian
citizenship established by the Ek Court suggests that distinctions can
be made between rights granted to citizens. This possibility is dis-
cussed below in section IV.C.
2. Derivative Naturalization
The Supreme Court determined that Governor Boyd was a citizen
in part because the facts indicated that he had derived citizenship
through his father's intent to become a citizen. Derivative citizenship
of a child upon a parent's naturalization is based upon the principle
that a child is a citizen of the country of the parents.169
continue in the exercise of the responsibilities of citizenship." Id. at art. 13, 15
Stat. 513, 516.
165. See F. COHEN, supra note 91, at 153-54.
166. H.R. Doc. No. 222, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924), reprinted in S.R. No. 441, 68th
Cong., 1st Sess., 2-3 (1924).
167. See AMERICAN INDIAN PoLIcY supra note 5, at 111.
168. Id. at 29-30.
169. Although statutes often referred to "parent(s)," the position usually taken was
based upon the common-law doctrine of primacy of male citizenship. Thus, it was
the father's nationality that determined citizenship. See J. KETrNR, THE DEVEL-
OPMENT OF AMERICAN CrrizENsnP, 1608-1870, at 13-20 (1978). The generally ac-
cepted view early in American history was that the male had authority over both
his wife and children. Id. at 321-22. The controlling statute and its application in
Boyd reflects this view. Act of Apr. 14, 1802, ch. 28, § 4,2 Stat. 153,155. The Boyd
Court reasoned that if a father filed a declaration of intention, the wife and chil-
dren acquired the same "inchoate status." There was no discussion of the citizen-
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The first naturalization law was passed by Congress in 1790,170 and
it reflected the existing state naturalization laws.171 The Act provided
that a "free white" alien was eligible for naturalization by a common-
law court of record after a period of two years residence in the United
States, and at least one years residence in the state where he sought
naturalization. He also had to possess good moral character and take
an oath to support the Constitution. His naturalization resulted in the
naturalization of his minor children.172 This naturalization law was
revised in 1795 to require that an alien file a declaration of intention to
become a citizen at least three years before seeking to be admitted as a
citizen. 7 3 In addition, the residence requirement was changed from
two to five years.174
A subsequent revision provided that a foreign-born child dwelling
in the United States at the time of the naturalization of their parent
automatically became a citizen. 7 5 The naturalization law was
amended in 1804 to establish the citizenship of the widow and children
of a foreign subject who declared his intention to become a citizen, but
died before he received his certificate of citizenship.176 The next ma-
jor change in naturalization came with the enactment of the Naturali-
zation Act of 1906,177 which was further amended in 1907 to provide
that a foreign-born child who was not in the United States when the
parent was naturalized, became a citizen from the time that, if while
still a minor, it came to reside permanently in the United States. 7 8
ship status or actions of Governor Boyd's mother. If an alien died or became
insane before completing the naturalization process, the widow or wife and chil-
dren could become naturalized by complying with the other provisions of the nat-
uralization laws without having to complete independent declarations of
intention.
170. Uniform Naturalization Act, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103 (1790)(repealed 1795).
171. See H.R. Doc. No. 46, 59th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1905).
172. Uniform Naturalization Act, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103, 104 (1790)(repealed 1795).
173. Act of Jan. 29, 1795, ch. 20, § 2, 1 Stat. 414, 415 (repealed 1802).
174. Id. at ch. 20, § 1, 1 Stat. 414.
175. Act of Apr. 14, 1802, ch. 28, § 4, 2 Stat. 153, 155.
176. Act of Mar. 26, 1804, ch. 47, § 2, 2 Stat. 292, 293. Prior to 1804, the wife and
children of a man who had filed a declaration of intention could not become natu-
ralized by completing the declarant's naturalization in the event he died or be-
came insane before he was able to become naturalized.
177. Act of June 29, 1906, ch. 3592, 34 Stat. 596.
178. Act of Mar. 2, 1907, ch. 2534, § 5, 34 Stat. 1228, 1229, provided:
That a child born without the United States of alien parents shall be
deemed a citizen of the United States by virtue of the naturalization of or
resumption of American citizenship by the parent: Provided, That such
naturalization or resumption takes place during the minority of such
child: And provided further, That the citizenship of such minor child
shall begin at the time such minor child begins to reside permanently in
the United States.
The 1906 Act and the 1907 amendments resulted from two reports issued regard-
ing existing citizenship law and naturalization procedures. Report to the Presi-
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Citizenship continued to be conferred upon foreign-born persons,
male or female, through the naturalization of the father during the
minority of such persons.1 79
The naturalization of a mother did not confer citizenship on minor
children, unless the father had died. A child's status continued to be
governed by the nationality of their father. 8 0 The 1905 Commission
on Naturalization expressed the belief that the provision was based on
the 1779 Virginia naturalization law which conferred citizenship upon
the child of a naturalized mother only if the father was not living at
the time.1 8 ' Our citizenship laws clearly expressed that paternal in-
tent with respect to nationality controlled that of a child.182
Although some courts had held that pursuant to the 1907 Naturali-
zation Act minor children living in the United States with their
mother, at the time she was naturalized by a competent court, were
also naturalized,183 this was an exception rather than the general rule.
This exception was applied, for example, where an individual was
born in England in 1913, to a mother who was originally an American
citizen and British father. He came to the United States with his par-
ents in 1919, where he had since continuously resided. His mother be-
came naturalized in 1925, and his father, who apparently did not file a
declaration of intention and was never naturalized, died in 1927. The
dent Commission on Naturalization H.R. Doc. No. 46,59th Cong. 1st Sess. (1905)
and H.R. Doc. No. 326, 59th Cong., 2d Sess. (1906).
179. See, e.g., Dorsey v. Brigham, 177 Ill. 250, 52 N.E. 303, (1898). See also Schuster v.
State, 80 Wis. 107,49 N.W. 30 (1891). This patriarchal approach also applied to the
citizenship of a woman. Early citizenship law provided that any American woman
who married a foreigner "shall take the nationality of her husband" [for so long
as the marriage lasted]. Act of Mar. 2, 1907, ch. 2534, § 3, 34 Stat. 1228, 1228-29.
Since the Act of Sept. 22, 1922, ch. 411, §§ 3, 7, 42 Stat. 1021, 1022, women who
married foreigners did not relinquish their citizenship and women who had lost
their citizenship by operation of the law could regain their U.S. citizenship
through naturalization and be restored to the same status, i.e., native-born or nat-
uralized citizen, that existed at the time citizenship was lost. The current form of
this law is contained in the Immigration and Nationality Act § 324,8 U.S.C. § 1435
(1988).
180. In re Citizenship Status of Minor Children Where Mother Alone Becomes Citi-
zen Through Naturalization, 25 F.2d 210 (D.N.J. 1928).
181. * * * And all infants wheresoever born, whose father, if living, or other-
wise, who mother was a citizen at the time of their birth, or who migrate
hither, their father, if livingor otherwise their mother, becoming a citi-
zen, or who migrate hither without father or mother, shall be deemed
citizens of this Commonwealth until they relinquish that character in
manner hereinafter expressed.
H.R. Doc. No. 46, supra note 178, at 41.
182. See, e.g., Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815, 823-24 (1971)(discussing "emphasis of pa-
ternal residence" in early citizenship laws to determine nationality of children
born abroad to U.S. citizen parents). Contra Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U.S. 308,
313 (1961)(1907 Act reference to "parent" included mother).
183. See, e.g., Kreitz v. Behrensmeyer, 125 IM. 141,17 N.E. 232 (1888); Citizenship of R.
Bryan Owen, 36 Op. Att'y Gen. 197 (1929).
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U.S. Attorney General opined that, if the child did not acquire citizen-
ship status at the time of his mother's naturalization, he became a citi-
zen by reason of his father's death and the other existing conditions.184
In order to express the intent of Congress more clearly, the 1907
Naturalization Act, was amended in 1934.185 The amendment re-
placed "parent" with the words "father or mother," in the section of
the act providing that a minor whose parent became naturalized
should be deemed a citizen. 8 6 The 1934 Act recognized the equality of
the intent of men and women in most cases18 7 of derivative citizenship
by providing, among other things, that (1) citizenship could be derived
by minor children of alien parents by virtue of the mother's as well as
the father's naturalization and (2) citizenship could be derived jus
sanguinis through the mother as well as the father.
Under early laws, derivative naturalization was not available to In-
dians. Justice Gray suggests in E1k that Indians could simply be natu-
ralized: "Such Indians, then, not being citizens by birth, can only
become citizens in the second way mentioned in the Fourteenth
Amendment, by being 'naturalized in the United States,' by or under
some treaty or statute."1ss However, collective naturalization was the
only option available at the time. Indians could not be naturalized as
individuals. The Act of July 14, 1870, provided that the naturalization
laws were extended to "aliens of African nativity and to persons of
African descent."1 8 9 The provision was construed literally to allow
naturalization of only caucasians and Africans. Indians continued to
be excluded from eligibility for naturalization.190 As expressed by the
1906 Commission on Naturalization, "[a] recent decision... confirmed
... [what is obvious] that an Indian is not 'a free white person or an
alien of African nativity or African descent.' "191 Therefore, even af-
ter the 1924 Act granting birth-right citizenship to Indians, they could
not be naturalized based upon individual intent and therefore Indian
children could not receive derivative naturalization. Indians born
elsewhere such as Canada or Mexico were prohibited from becoming
184. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
185. Act of May 24, 1934, ch. 344, § 2, 48 Stat. 797.
186. See United States v. Perkins, 17 F. Supp. 177 (D.D.C. 1936).
187. While it was unclear in the 1934 Act subsequent amendments provided that ille-
gitimate children of naturalizing mothers receive derivative naturalization, but
not illegitimate children of naturalizing fathers.
188. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 103 (1884). It is possible to construe the court's lan-
guage as an invitation to Congress to use its naturalization power to enact a stat-
ute conferring citizenship, which it subsequently did with the 1924 Citizenship
Act.
189. Act of July 14, 1870, ch. 254, § 7, 16 Stat. 254, 256.
190. See generally J. KErrNER, supra note 169, at 288-89 (stating view that Indians
were the most isolated group in part because of citizenship laws).
191. See H.R. Doc. No. 326, supra note 142, at 99 (citing In re Burton, 1 Alaska 111
(1900)).
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citizens until the law was changed in 1940.192 It was not until 1940 that
Indians were eligible for the parental acquisition of citizenship
through naturalization and thus subject to the derivative citizenship
status that had been granted Governor Boyd. However, admitted to
citizenship as "free white persons" was not applied consistently and on
at least one occasion was held to include a Mexican who was largely
Indian in blood.193 Thus, while an intent consideration was available
to Governor Boyd in resolving his citizenship the inapplicability of de-
rivative or any individual naturalization to John Elk made any such
inquiry irrelevant.
While there have been some criticisms of derivative citizenship the
principle has continued in our naturalization law, 94 although some
requirements have changed.195
3. Loss of Citizenship
An exploration of developing citizenship law also includes an in-
quiry as to whether there is certain conduct that should not be toler-
ated by citizens to the extent that anyone engaging in such conduct
will lose their citizenship as well as the citizenship of their minor chil-
dren. As described by T. Alexander Aleinikoff, there are essentially
two ways that citizenship can be lost, (1) through voluntary relin-
quishment by the citizen-expatriation, or (2) revocation by the na-
tion, referred to as denationalization or denaturalization.196
192. Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, 54 Stat. 1137 (repealed 1952).
193. See, In re Rodriguez, 81 F. 337 (1897).
194. One member of the 1905 Commission, Richard Campbell from the Department of
Commerce and Labor, proposed that the naturalization laws be changed to elimi-
nate the automatic naturalization of foreign-born minor children when their par-
ents are naturalized. Another Commission member, Gaillard Hunt from the
State Department, rejected such a proposal as not being consistent with historical
understandings of the law of citizenship in the United States as well as the then
existing law of England. He did not find that the few isolated instances of citizen-
ship being granted to "young men who are not fitted for citizenship" and who
would not have been able to be naturalized on their own, justified such a change
to effect an entire class of individuals. He further asserted that safeguards placed
upon the naturalization process would sufficiently exclude those not "fit" to be
citizens. H.R. Doc. No. 46, supra note 171, at 42-43.
195. The requirements for naturalization are contained in Immigration and Naturali-
zation Act §§ 310-339, 8 U.S.C. 1421-1450. A child under the age of 18 who is born
outside of the United States acquires citizenship upon the naturalization of their
parent(s) pursuant to Immigration and Naturalization Act § 321, 8 U.S.C. § 1432
(1988).
196. Aleinikoff, Theories of Loss of Citizenship, 84 MIcH. L. REv. 1471 (1986). This
article contains a complete discussion of the various ways that a person can lose
their citizenship and the historical bases for Congressional actions including cer-
tain conduct in statutes governing loss of citizenship.
Expatriation rather than denationalization has caused the most controversy.
The first case decided by the Supreme Court regarding an individual's right to
expatriate himself was Talbot v. Janson, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133 (1795). The Court
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Subjective intent has gained increasing importance in determining
whether an individual's actions have resulted in a loss of citizenship
while decreasing in importance in determining the acquisition of citi-
zenship. This makes it relatively easy to acquire U.S. citizenship and
extremely difficult to lose citizenship. A certificate of citizenship is
cancelled ab initio upon denationalization. In contrast, when expatria-
tion occurs, the certificate of citizenship issued upon naturalization is
valid from the time issued until the date of expatriation. The un-
resolved issue in this consideration is how to determine an individual's
intent regarding continuing citizenship when their conduct is inconsis-
tent with continued participation in the political community.
The question in the situation that was converse to the situation in
Boyd also arose early in the development of citizenship law. That is,
whether a minor child that acquired citizenship through the naturali-
zation of a parent lost that citizenship by the expatriation or denation-
alization of the parent from which the child derived citizenship. In
fact, this situation has not been limited to the naturalized citizen. The
same problem was presented if an American born child's parent was
naturalized in a foreign nation while the child was still a minor.
Under Boyd and the law then existing it would seem that the ques-
tions in both situations would have to be answered in the affirma-
tive-if a parent relinquished their citizenship while the child was a
minor then the child also lost her citizenship.
refused to recognize such a right. This rejection was based upon the view that
once citizenship was properly acquired an individual lacked control over the re-
tention of that citizenship.
Congress enacted the Act of July 27, 1868, ch. 249, 15 Stat. 223, primarily to
protect naturalized U.S. citizens who returned to their countries of origin and to
address situations involving U.S. citizens who purported to expatriate themselves
in order to join in a conflict between two foreign nations without violating U.S.
laws requiring citizens to remain neutral. The Act provided:
Whereas the right of expatriation is a natural and inherent right of
all people, indispensable to the enjoyment of the rights of life, liberty,
and the pursuit of happiness; and whereas in the recognition of this prin-
ciple this government has freely received emigrants from all nations, and
invested them with the rights of citizenship; and whereas it is claimed
that such American citizens, with their descendants, are subjects of for-
eign states, owing allegiance to the governments thereof; and whereas it
is necessary to the maintenance of public peace that this claim of foreign
allegiance should be promptly and finally disavowed: Therefore .... any
declaration, instruction, opinion, order, or decision of any officers of this
government which denies, restricts, impairs, or questions the right of ex-
patriation, is hereby declared inconsistent with the fundamental princi-
ples of this government.
Id. at § 1, 15 Stat. 223, 223-24. This statute reflected the principle applied in
American citizenship acquisition that an alien could become naturalized because
he could expatriate himself from his former nationality.
On the other hand, denationalization presumes that the naturalization was
obtained through fraud or mistake and therefore is null.
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Some commentators argued against such a conclusion because the
child in the latter case was a constitutional citizen and therefore Con-
gress could not enact a statute that changed the effect of birth in the
United States.197 However, Congress could provide for voluntary ex-
patriation and determine that certain acts constituted a voluntary re-
linquishment of citizenship. For example, a woman who married a
foreign national voluntarily expatriated herself by adopting the na-
tionality of her husband even if she expressly stated that she did not
want to give up her U.S. citizenship.198 Her intent was determined by
her actions. Alternatively, her husband's intent as to citizenship con-
trolled after marriage and was therefore imputed to the wife. It was
believed that the woman had made the voluntary choice of marriage
and thus the voluntary expatriation. Similarly, the parent had made
the voluntary choice and that choice, like the choice to become natu-
ralized was imputed to the child.199
It was argued however, that it did not logically follow that a child
had voluntarily expatriated herself simply because the parent had
made a choice of a new nationality.200 The decision that a parent's
choice also controlled expatriation or denaturalization would seem
consistent with the reasoning in Boyd. The parent's intent or choice
controls with respect to loss of citizenship, not just the acquisition of
citizenship. While it is arguable that Wong Kim Ark, would support a
conclusion that a parent's citizenship status is not controlling, the dif-
ference is that there the parent was not called upon to express an in-
tent, there was no act, other than giving birth in the United States,
that had to be performed to confer citizenship status. While the Court
in Boyd indicated that a child could make a choice upon reaching his
majority, even if the father had taken an oath renouncing allegiance to
his country of nationality this only applied where naturalization had
not been completed. Therefore, if a parent chose to become natural-
ized in a foreign country while the child is a minor, the child acquired
the new nationality of the parent. To prevent loss of citizenship by a
parent's actions, the conclusion must be that the parent can acquire a
benefit for the child--citizenship, but not cause the child to suffer a
loss-expatriation. To accept this argument, however, one has to con-
clude that loss of citizenship should be more fervently protected and
scrutinized than acquisition of citizenship. The child then retains her
United States citizenship and also acquires citizenship in her parent's
new nation. The development of the law on loss of citizenship sup-
ports this conclusion. The problems arising in this area are largely
197. See, e.g., Orfield, International Law-Citizenship-Expatriation-Effect of Expa-
triation of Father upon Citizenship of Child, 13 NEB. L. BuLL 466, 467-68 (1935).
198. Act of Mar. 2, 1907, ch. 2534, § 3, 34 Stat. 1228, 1228-29. See supra note 179.
199. See, e.g., United States v. Reid 73 F.2d 153 (9th Cir. 1934).
200. See Orfield, supra note 197, at 468.
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due to resistance to dual nationality. 20 1
Dual nationality is the consequence of the conflicting laws of dif-
ferent nations, and has been discouraged by the United States. 202
There are four principle groups of United States citizens who possess
dual nationality. First, there are persons born in the United States of
alien parents, and the country of the parents' nationality also claims
them as citizens. 203 The second group includes persons born abroad
whose parents are citizens of the United States, but on whom citizen-
ship is also conferred by the land of their birth.204 A third group in-
cludes persons who become citizens of the United States either by
their own or their parents' naturalization, but whose country of origin
does not recognize expatriation. Finally, there are persons who are
citizens of the United States, but whose parents expatriate themselves
from the United States by becoming naturalized in a foreign state
while the child was a minor.205 It is also possible to acquire another
type of dual nationality that might be more accurately described as
"triple" nationality. This occurs when a child is born in the United
States to parents who are nationals of two separate countries that both
confer citizenship through descent.
The official policy of the United States has been to discourage the
incidence of dual nationality. 206 Notwithstanding this policy, it has
generally been accepted that some United States citizens may possess
another nationality as the result of separate conflicting laws of other
countries since each sovereign state has the right inherent in its sover-
eignty to determine who shall be its citizens and what laws will govern
them.
Prior to the major changes made in the immigration laws by the
201. For a discussion of resistance to dual nationality by the United States and other
nations, see Hammar, State, Nation, and Dual Citizenship in IMMIGRATION AND
THE POLITICS OF CITIZENSHIP IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA, (W. Brubaker ed.
1989) at 81. In the same text, William Brubaker provides a general discussion of
problems of dual citizenship and suggests that in the United States, we have both
(1) a high incidence of dual nationals because of the ease with which a person
acquires U.S. citizenship under the fourteenth amendment as well as (2) a diffi-
culty in determining the extent of dual nationals since the oath of allegiance re-
quires naturalized citizens to renounce allegiance to other nations, yet the other
nation may not accept such renunciation. In addition, citizens that acquire U.S.
citizenship at birth under the jus soli principle may have also acquired citizenship
in the nation of their parents under the jus sanguinis principle. W. BRUBAKER,
CITIZENSHIP AND NATURALIZATION: POLICIES AND POLITICS 99, 115.
202. See Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717, 734 (1952).
203. See, e.g., icL (Japan); Fletes-Mora v. Rogers, 160 F. Supp 215 (S.D. Cal. 1958)
(MEXICO).
204. Cf Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815 (1971).
205. See, e.g., Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325 (1939).
206. See Savorgnan v. United States, 338 U.S. 491, 500 (1950); Warsoff, Citizenship in
the State of Israel, 33 N.Y.U. L. REv. 857 (1958)(detailing efforts of the U.S. gov-
ernment to prevent dual American-Israeli citizenship).
[Vol. 70:462
CITIZENSHIP LAW
1952 Amendment, 20 7 many cases held that since an order of denatural-
ization made the original naturalization void, it related back to the
date of naturalization, and any children or other relatives benefitting
from the void naturalization also lost their citizenship or other ac-
quired immigration benefit.2 08 Although there was no express statu-
tory provision prior to 1952 that revocations were to have retroactive
effect, courts had developed the judicial doctrine of relation-back. As
early as 1906, the Naturalization Act authorized the revocation of
fraudulently obtained naturalization certificates. Courts reasoned
that exercise of this authority resulted in a void grant of citizenship as
well as any other rights attached to such grant. In applying this rea-
soning to derivative citizenship, courts held that a denaturalized
alien's family derived no citizenship rights.209 In such a situation, an
alien never became a citizen and consequently the citizenship never
existed, and prior to 1940, a derivative citizen would also lose their
citizenship status. In one early decision, the Supreme Court cited with
approval a lower court's application of that theory: "It is [the appli-
cant's] province, and he is bound, to see that the jurisdictional facts
upon which the grant is predicated actually exist, and if they do not he
takes nothing by his paper grant." 210
The development of the relation-back theory was limited by Con-
gress when it enacted the Nationality Act of 1940.211 A provision was
included to protect children's derivative citizenship rights from revo-
cation, except where the primary alien's revocation was based upon
actual fraud.2 12 The parental intent ceased to control the child's in-
tent with respect to loss of citizenship pursuant to denaturalization.
207. Act of June 27, 1952, ch. 477, § 403(a)(42), 66 Stat. 163, 280.
208. See Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227 (1912); Battaglino v. Marshall, 172
F.2d 979, 981 (2d Cir. 1949); Rosenberg v. United States, 60 F.2d 475 (3d Cir. 1932).
209. See, e.g., Battaglino v. Marshall, 172 F.2d 979 (2d Cir. 1949); Rosenberg v. United
States, 60 F.2d 475 (3d Cir. 1932).
210. Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1912) (quoting United States v.
Spohrer, 175 F. 440, 442 (1910)). See also Luria v. United States, 231 U.S. 9, 24,
(1913).
211. Nationality Act of 1940, cl. 876, 54 Stat. 1137 (repealed 1952).
212. Id. at ch. 876, § 338(d), 54 Stat. 1137, 1159 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1451(e)(1988)). The relevant section of the Nationality Act of 1940 provides:
(d) The revocation and setting aside of the order admitting any person
to citizenship and canceling his certificate of naturalization under the
provisions of subsection (a) of section 338 shall not, where such action
takes place after the effective date of this Act, result in the loss of citi-
zenship or any right or privilege of citizenship which would have been
derived by or available to a wife or minor child of the naturalized person
had such naturalization not been revoked, but the citizenship and any
such right or privilege of such wife or minor child shall be deemed valid
to the extent that it shall not be affected by such revocation: Provided,
That this subsection shall not apply in any case where the revocation and
setting aside of this order was the result of actual fraud.
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In 1950, the Senate Judiciary Committee summarized the existing law
as follows:
The effect of a decree of denaturalization, as distinguished from expatriation
or forfeiture of citizenship, is to declare that the 'naturalized' person never
was in fact naturalized, because either by fraud or illegality the statutory pre-
requisites were not met. The naturalization laws make certain reservations,
saving the naturalization of children who derive citizenship from a parent
from the alienage which they would otherwise incur because of the fraudulent
or illegal naturalization.
2 1 3
Parental actions were also considered as determinative of a minor's
citizenship or loss there of in questions of expatriation. Courts once
held that a citizen by birth could be expatriated during their minority
by act of their parents.2 1 4 The Supreme Court held in Perkins v.
Elg215 that these decisions were in error.2 1 6 The Court reasoned that a
minor's right to elect to retain her United States citizenship prevented
loss of citizenship based upon a parent's naturalization in a foreign
country even though this resulted in problems of dual nationality.
Similar to the resolution in Boyd, the Court found there was no re-
quirement to make a formal application to demonstrate an intent to
retain U.S. citizenship where a parent had taken some action that ef-
fected a minor's citizenship status. Instead, the intent of the citizen-
child could be determined by an examination of the individual's ac-
tions. There was no voluntary intent established by the parental expa-
triation. The child had therefore not intended to relinquish her
citizenship after reaching the age of majority unless she engaged in
some inconsistent conduct.
The law as it has developed with respect to loss of derivative citi-
zenship is consistent with Boyd if the primary focus is individual
rather than parental intent. A child upon reaching majority could
take some action that showed they had no intent to rely on a parent's
action that conferred citizenship. Similarly, a child's actions can be
evidence that they did not intend to rely on the parent's actions that
resulted in loss of citizenship.21 7
213. S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 755 (1950).
214. See, e.g., United States v. Reid, 73 F.2d 153 (9th Cir. 1934)(reversing In re Reid, 6
F. Supp. 800 (D.C. Or. 1934)); Citizenship of Tobiassen, 36 Op. Att'y Gen. 535
(1932).
215. 307 U.S. 325 (1939).
216. Id. at 349.
217. For a thorough discussion on the issue of loss of citizenship and the role of intent
as compared to conduct, see James, The Board of Appellate Review of the Depart-
ment of State: The Right to Appellate Review of Administrative Determinations
of Loss of Nationality, 23 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 261 (1986) and Aleinikoff, supra
note 196.
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B. Statutory Procedures Affecting Intent
The Immigration Act of 1990218 contains notable changes in the
naturalization procedure. The authority to naturalize persons no
longer is conferred upon the United States District Courts. The Attor-
ney General is now vested with this authority,219 making it an admin-
istrative rather than judicial process. The two-step procedure of first
filing an application for a petition for naturalization with the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service, and upon approval, filing a peti-
tion for naturalization with the district court has been eliminated.
Now a prospective citizen is only required to file a petition for natural-
ization with the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The certifi-
cate of naturalization will be issued by the Service instead of the
district courts and the Immigration and Naturalization Service is
charged with the responsibility of maintaining, "in chronological or-
der, indexed, and consecutively numbered, as part of its permanent
records, all declarations of intention and applications for naturaliza-
tion filed with the office."220 The 1905 Commission on Naturalization
made similar recommendations based in part upon concerns voiced in
the 1891 Nebraska election contest.
1. Proof Problems
Proving naturalization or declaration of intention to become a citi-
zen presented numerous problems prior to the establishment of ex-
isting naturalization procedures. Proof of the naturalization of the
parents generally required presentation of the record of the naturali-
zation proceedings. Parol evidence was routinely allowed to prove the
minority and residence of minors.221 Lack of uniformity in the ex-
isting procedures for filing declarations, becoming naturalized, and
court decisions regarding the proof required to establish a claim to citi-
zenship contributed to the Court's need to resort to intent in Boyd.
The Boyd decision arguably contributed to the confusion.
President Theodore Roosevelt issued an executive order in 1905 di-
recting the formation of the 1905 Commission or Naturalization to
218. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978.
219. Immigration Act of 1990, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1421(a)(West Supp. 1991)(effective Oct. 1,
1991). "(a) Authority In Attorney General. The sole authority to naturalize per-
sons as citizens of the United States is conferred upon the Attorney General." I&
Subsequent to the writing of this Article, the Immigration and Naturalization Act
was amended by the Judicial Naturalization ceremonies amendments of 1991 to
restore authority to the district courts to perform naturalization ceremonies.
Dec. 12, 1991, Pub. L. 102-232, Title I., § 102(a), Title III, § 305(a), 105 Stat. 1734,
1749 (effective January 1992).
220. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 407(d)(17), 104 Stat. 4978, 5045
(amending § 339(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1450 (1988)).
221. See, e.g., Belcher v. Farren, 89 Cal. 73, 26 P. 791 (1891). See also Prentice v. Miller,
82 Cal. 570, 23 P. 189 (1890).
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prepare and propose a new naturalization law. The Commission con-
sisted of three administrative officers, one each from the Departments
of Justice, State, Commerce and Labor. The report issued by the
Commission sounded like a summary of the Boyd election contest. It
concluded that the naturalization process was tainted with fraud and
that the desire to vote was the most common reason for fraud. West-
ern states were accused of manipulating rights of aliens such as grant-
ing the right of suffrage, to attract immigrants.222 The fraud resulted
from aliens being sought out by "political agents" who paid the newly
naturalized citizens for their vote. In attempt to eliminate some of the
fraud, the commission proposed that the naturalization fee be in-
creased, certificates of naturalization be registered, and that naturali-
zation be prohibited for thirty days preceding a presidential or
congressional election.223
While the report recommended a more standard and formal proce-
dure for naturalization,224 it stopped short of recommending that nat-
uralization only occur in federal court or be conducted by a federal
agency, even though it noted that only Canada joined the United
States in making naturalization a judicial function.225 The state courts
were viewed as providing a more careful procedure than some federal
courts and there was no other entity established that could handle the
task. The report also suggested that a rule be established that would
result in "uniform fairness" among aliens seeking citizenship. It was
concluded that fairness would not result if naturalization was confined
to federal courts because the individuals residing where federal courts
existed would have an advantage over aliens that had to travel to the
location of a federal court. The Commission did recommend however
that the number of courts allowed to conduct naturalization should be
limited. It was necessary to limit the number of courts because they
were competing with each other to handle the largest number of natu-
ralizations so that they could collect the accompanying fees. They
would be limited depending upon whether a federal court was in that
district. If so, the federal court would have exclusive jurisdiction, if
not, one state court was designated as having exclusive jurisdiction.
The strongest criticism of procedures existing during the Boyd con-
flict voiced by the Commission was regarding the lack of federal su-
222. For a discussion of the accusations of over-aggressiveness of the Western states,
see D. WARD, W.S. BERNARD & R. UEDA, IMMIGRATION 117 (1982).
223. In the accompanying report of the Special Examiner of the Department of Jus-
tice, it was suggested that the increased fee which applied both to declarations of
intentions and certificates of naturalization would make it too expensive for polit-
ical agents to assist in fraudulent naturalization. See H.R. DOC. No. 46, supra note
178, at 79-92.
224. Id- at 17-20.
225. Id- at 18.
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pervision of the naturalization process.226 To assure that accurate
records were made regarding naturalization, the Commission recom-
mended that along with abolishing the declaration of intention re-
quirement, a formal petition be filed at least three months before the
naturalization was heard in court with a duplicate of the petition being
sent to the bureau of naturalization. Under the recommended proce-
dure, the Commission concluded that "[f]rauds committed against the
courts or by the courts should under these circumstances become
rare."227 The report also criticized the granting of the "inchoate sta-
tus" that had been used by the Boyd Court. Several of the recommen-
dations were incorporated into the 1906 Naturalization Act which
remained the basic statute until 1940.
The Nationality Act of 1940228 made it a felony for a person
"[k]nowingly to falsely represent himself to be a citizen of the United
States without having been naturalized or admitted to citizenship, or
without otherwise being a citizen of the United States."229 Under this
statute and its subsequent codifications, the courts used the approach
suggested in Boyd. They allowed the issue of a person's citizenship to
be submitted to a jury, if there were facts upon which a jury could
reasonably draw an inference that an individual was a citizen, and pro-
vided there was some showing that no other proof was available.23 0
226. Id. at 20-29.
227. Id at 28. The commission summarized its principle recommendations as follows:
First. That no one be admitted to citizenship who does not solemnly
declare his intention of permanently residing in the United States.
Second. That no one be admitted to citizenship who does not know
the English language.
Third. That the declaration of intention be abolished and there be
substituted in its place a petition to be filed with the court before which
the application for naturalization will be heard, at least ninety days
before the hearing.
Fourth. That only Federal courts in cities of over 100,000 inhabitants
shall have power to naturalize aliens who are residents of such cities.
Fifth. That the wording of the certificate of naturalization be pre-
scribed by law, that it be printed upon safety paper and furnished to the
courts by the bureau of naturalization.
Sixth. That there be prescribed by law a uniform fee, and that a por-
tion thereof be turned into the Federal Treasury. Seventh. That there be
established in the Department of Commerce and Labor a bureau of natu-
ralization to supervise the execution of the naturalization laws and re-
ceive returns of naturalizations, pending and accomplished.
Id at 28-29.
228. The Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, 54 Stat. 1137 (repealed 1952).
229. Id. at ch. 876, § 346(a)(18), 54 Stat. 1137, 1165 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 911 (1988)(making it a crime if one "falsely and willfully represents himself to
be a citizen of the United States")).
230. See, e.g., Rassano v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 377 F.2d 971 (7th
Cir. 1967). Petitioner was unable to produce evidence to supply the necessary
foundation for the admissibility of hearsay. There was no showing that other
means of proof were unavailable, such as an allegation that the certificate of nat-
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Although it is sometimes necessary to resort to evidence upon
which a jury might find that citizenship has been acquired, the current
system for maintaining records of naturalization and issuing certifi-
cates of citizenship eliminates most of the proof problems that occured
in Boyd and thus requested the Court to consider intent. These proce-
dures were established in part because of the 1905 commission's re-
view of Boyd.
2. The Rise and Fall of the Declaration of Intention
Boyd was decided at a time when the declaration of intention was
perhaps at the peak of its importance. It's primacy eventually began
to decline. Contrary to the recommendation of the 1905 Commission,
the declaration of intention was maintained in the 1906 Act and re-
quired of all applicants for citizenship as a prerequisite to citizen-
ship2 31 until it was made optional by the 1952 Immigration and
Nationality Act.23 2 The declaration was introduced into American
naturalization law in 1795 by the second Act of Congress on the sub-
ject of naturalization.233 For the more than 150 years between these
enactments, Congress considered it appropriate to require aliens to de-
clare their intention to become United States citizens several years
before they petitioned for naturalization. Exceptions were made from
time to time to avoid hardship or to expedite the naturalization of a
favored group, but until the 1952 enactment, the declaration consti-
tuted the "first papers" toward citizenship in the usual naturalization
procedure. 23 4
In a case that arose in Nebraska subsequent to Boyd, Trabing v.
United States,235 the court had to consider the validity of an individ-
ual's claim that he was a citizen of Nebraska as well as the nation
based upon an application of the principles announced in Boyd. Ar-
thur Trabing claimed that like Governor Boyd, he had come to the
uralization had been lost or destroyed. It was held that petitioner's evidence was
insufficient to raise a genuine issue on his claim to citizenship.
See also Colt v. United States, 158 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1946). Rumanian-born
defendant had been living in the United States for at least nineteen years prior to
committing the alleged criminal act of registering to vote in Florida and thereby
claiming to be a United States citizen. He maintained that, having lived in the
United States since the age of four, he was a naturalized citizen. The government
was required to offer sufficient evidence from which a jury could draw the infer-
ence that the person in question was neither natural-born nor naturalized.
231. Act of June 29, 1906, ch. 3592, §§ 4, 27, 34 Stat. 596, 596, 603.
232. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 334, 66 Stat. 163, 254
(1952)(codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1445(f)(1988)).
233. Act of Jan. 29, 1795, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 414.
234. See Joint Hearings before the Subcommittees of the Committees on the Judici-
ary, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., on S. 716, H.R. 2379, and H.R. 2816, pp. 79-80, 723-25; S.
REP. No. 1515, supra note 213, at 732-34.
235. 32 Ct. Cl. 440 (1897).
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United States at an early age with his father, that his father had taken
an oath of allegiance to the United States (at the time that he went to
work in the Quartermaster Department), and that he himself had
moved to Nebraska in 1866. Also, he alleged that he was a resident of
the State in 1867, at the time of Nebraska's admission into the Union.
The court distinguished the situation in Trabing from Boyd by finding
that Trabing's father had never sought naturalization nor filed a decla-
ration of intention. Additionally, the only evidence that his father had
voted was hearsay. The court viewed Trabing's act of applying for and
receiving naturalization in 1892 as inconsistent with his claim to al-
ready be a citizen.
As the Court explained, a minor, by the declaration of his parents,
acquired an inchoate status but on attaining majority he had an elec-
tion and could repudiate the status. Trabing's application for naturali-
zation, which occurred many years after he attained his majority,
negatived the presumption of an earlier election to become a citizen.
The reasoning is somewhat inconsistent with Boyd in that the Court
indicated that the hearsay evidence submitted by Boyd regarding his
father's naturalization was appropriate for a jury to consider. Further,
Governor Boyd's action of obtaining a judicial decision with respect to
his citizenship was motivated by the same factor motivating Trabing to
become naturalized-his citizenship was questioned.
The declaration of intent seemed to be designed to eliminate a need
to consider subjective intent. The desire to become a citizen as well as
the required period of residency could be established by the filing of
the dedication. Intent would only be evidenced by the signed declara-
tion. However, official records of both declarations and naturaliza-
tions were not reliable. Consequently, intent coupled with some
conduct evidencing the intent such as the act of voting developed as
the crucial element needed to establish a presumption of citizenship in
the absence of naturalization documents.236 As long as the declaration
of intention was required, inconsistent approaches were taken with
respect to declarants. In 1906, Nebraska along with eight other states
granted the right to vote to declarants. A declarant could be required
to serve in a war, but was not accorded the protection of the U.S. Gov-
ernment if abroad.23 7 A child of a declarant was unsure about the sta-
tus acquired and a determination as to their citizenship was uncertain
as evidenced by the different results in Boyd and Trabing.238 It is
236. See, e.g., Kadlec v. Pavik, 9 N.D. 278, 83 N.W. 5 (1900)(party was shown to have
been an alien, proof that he voted overcame the presumption of alienage, and
raised a presumption of naturalization).
237. See H.R. Doc. No. 326, supm note 142, at 20. The report uses "inchoate status" to
describe the status conferred on a declarant (quoting Boyd at 143 U.S. 135, 178
(1892)). Nebraska, Arkansas, Indiana, Kansas, Michigan, Missouri, Texas, Ore-
gon, and Wisconsin were noted as having granted the right to vote to declarants.
238. See supra text accompanying notes 72-75 & 235-36.
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quite possible that neither father had been naturalized. As early as
1885, President Cleveland had urged Congress to enact legislation
clearly defining the rights and obligations attaching to the "inchoate
status" acquired by a declarant.2 3 9
During the late 1800s and early 1900s more certificates of intention
than certificates of naturalization were filed. It was assumed by the
1905 Commission on Naturalization that this was the apparent result
of some declarants believing they were made citizens by the declara-
tion. The Commission recommended the repeal of the declaration of
intention. It was noted in the report that the only other country re-
quiring a declaration of intention was Mexico. The report noted that
Alexander Porter Morse in his treatise on citizenship had recom-
mended that the intention to adopt an allegiance to the United States
be evidenced by permanent residence rather than a declaration of in-
tent. He suggested that "[t]he taking out of two papers is cumbersome
and unnecessary." 240 The use of the declaration of intention and the
lack of uniform procedures was criticized for the same reasons that
had led to a favorable decision for Governor Boyd.
As a result of the report, the declaration of intention was main-
tained but lost some of its effect. No longer did a wife (widow) or child
acquire citizenship automatically upon the death 24 1 or insanity2 42 of a
declarant. They were required to complete the naturalization pro-
cess.24 3 This was consistent with the holding in Boyd that the child
had accrued some "inchoate status" which eliminated some of the pre-
requisites to naturalization if completed by the father, but required
either individual or collective naturalization to acquire citizenship.
The 1950 Report of the Committee on the Judiciary which led to
the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act repeated the recommenda-
tion of the early 1900s--eliminate the declaration of intention.2 44 The
document that had been used to establish the citizenship of Governor
Boyd was criticized as "serv[ing] no useful purpose." 245 Congress ac-
cepted the recommendation in part. Under the 1952 Act, declarations
239. H.R. Doc. No. 326, supra note 142, at 22 (quoting President Cleveland's 1885 an-
nual message).
240. H.R. Doc. No. 46, supra note 178, at 17.
241. Act of June 29, 1906, ch. 3592, § 4(Sixth), 34 Stat. 596, 598.
242. Act of Feb. 24, 1911, ch. 151, 36 Stat. 929.
243. See, e.g., In re Schmidt, 161 F. 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1908)(An alien son, whose father
declared his intention of becoming a citizen but died before being naturalized and
during son's minority, could acquire naturalization upon complying with the
other provisions for naturalization without making a declaration of intention).
244. S. REP. No. 1515, supra note 213, at 744.
245. The Nationality Act of 1940 set formal requirements for the filing of a declaration
of intention. Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, § 328, 54 Stat. 1137, 1151. The 1950
Committee on the Judiciary criticized this provision and recommended that the
declaration of intention be eliminated since it served no useful purpose. S.REP.
No. 1515, supra note 213, at 738.
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of intention were eliminated as a prerequisite to naturalization.246
Under current law, a declaration of intention may be filed with the
Immigration and Naturalization Service.247 The apparent objective of
retaining this provision as optional was to preserve the rights of aliens
under state laws, where, for example, there was a requirement that a
legal resident alien shall have filed his declaration of intention before
he could obtain work.248 However, there are other benefits which
have accrued to non-citizens from the filing of a declaration of inten-
tion for filing a complaint. For example, section 102 of the Immigra-
tion Reform and Control Act of 1986249 required that an individual file
a declaration of intention in order to be protected by the anti-discrimi-
nation provisions of the Act that prohibited citizenship status discrimi-
nation. Section 533 of the Immigration Act of 1990 eliminated this
requirement.2 50
C. Distinguishing Between Citizens: Second-class Citizenship?
Another contemporary issue presented is whether it is constitu-
tionally permissible to distinguish between citizens. Attempts to jus-
tify distinctions have suggested that a birth-right citizen is entitled to
certain rights not guaranteed to those who acquire their citizenship
through naturalization. The rejection of any consideration of John
Elk's individual intent along with the subsequent passage of the 1924
Citizenship Act left us with the practice of conferring citizenship on
some individuals by statutory enactment even if they acquired citizen-
ship at the time of their birth rather than through some process of
naturalization.
The majority opinion in Elk stated that the fourteenth amendment
"contemplates two sources of citizenship, and two sources only: birth
246. Act of June 27, 1952, Title HI ch. 2, § 334, 66 Stat. 254.
247. Immigration and Nationality Act, § 334, 8 U.S.C. § 1445(f)(1988):
Any alien over eighteen years of age who is residing in the United
States pursuant to a lawful admission for permanent residence may...
make and file in duplicate... a signed declaration of intention to become
a citizen of the United States . . .Nothing in this subsection shall be
construed as requiring any such alien to make and file a declaration of
intention as a condition precedent to filing a petition for naturalization.
This was amended to read:
An alien over 18 years of age who is residing in the United States
pursuant to a lawful admission for permanent residence may file with
the Attorney General a declaration of intention to become a citizen of
the United States. Such a declaration shall be filed in duplicate and in a
form prescribed by the Attorney General and shall be accompanied by
an application prescribed and approved by the Attorney General.
8 U.S.C.A. § 1445(g)(West Supp. 1991).
248. See Joint Hearings on S. 716, H.R. 2379 and H.R. 2816, supra note 234, at 80; S.
REP. No. 1515, supra note 213, at 738.
249. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(b)(1988)(amended 1990).
250. Immigration Act of 1990, Publ. L. No. 101-649, § 533, 104 Stat. 4978, 5054-55.
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and naturalization." 25 1 The fourteenth amendment restricts the abil-
ity of Congress to confer citizenship other than through naturaliza-
tion. Therefore, seemingly, the choice left to Congress after Elk was
to naturalize Indians. The 1924 Act provided for the acquisition of citi-
zenship at birth, presumably naturalization by birth. Congress had
historically provided for another form of naturalization by birth. Chil-
dren born abroad to United States citizens have acquired citizenship at
birth since the 1790 naturalization law. This jus sanguinis citizenship,
however, has been excluded from the fourteenth amendment by the
Supreme Court. In Rogers v. Bellei,252 the Court held that such citi-
zens were not "Fourteenth-Amendment-first-sentence citizen[s]" 253
and since the citizenship clause of the fourteenth amendment did not
apply to an individual born abroad to a U.S. parent, it was permissible
for Congress to include a condition subsequent to the statutory grant
of citizenship.25 4 If Congress can make such individuals citizens then
they must be naturalized citizens. However, Congress does not view
this as "naturalizing" individuals. Congress has defined naturalization
as the conferring of nationality after birth by any means.255 Since In-
dians and children born aboard acquire citizenship at birth they appar-
ently are not considered naturalized by Congress. As the Supreme
Court tells us, neither are they constitutional citizens. Therefore, we
251. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 101 (1884). It almost seems as though Congress and
the Supreme Court were working at times at cross purposes in their attempts to
define citizenship. At first, since there was no definition of citizenship, it was
simply assumed that birth in the United States conferred citizenship. Congress
felt it necessary to clarify how citizenship could be acquired at birth by children
of United States citizens born aboard, so using its powers to naturalize enacted
statutory provisions effecting jus sanguinis citizenship. When the fourteenth
amendment was ratified, the Supreme Court believed that it had found its defini-
tion of citizenship. For example, in Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621, 625 (1904), the
Court stated, 'The first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment is in effect a
national naturalization law; and the acquisition of United States and state citizen-
ship is solely regulated by it." However, the fourteenth amendment only ad-
dressed citizenship by birth or naturalization in the United States. See discussion
in Gordon, Who Can Be President of the United States: The Unresolved Enigma,
28 MD. L. REv. 1, 13-15 (1968), regarding the problems encountered in trying to
interpret the fourteenth amendment as defining citizenship. To further compli-
cate matters, Congress added its definition of naturalization to limit naturaliza-
tion to acquisition of citizenship after birth. When the Court announced in Elk
that citizenship could be acquired only by birth or naturalization, and suggested
that the only possibility open to Indians was naturalization, it seemed to include
acquisition at birth other than pursuant to the fourteenth amendment as
naturalization.
252. 401 U.S. 815 (1971).
253. Id. at 827.
254. The provision required that such child born to an American parent should lose
that citizenship unless he resided in the United States for the time period speci-
fied by Congress. Id. at 816. The statutory provision requiring a period of resi-
dence for the child was subsequently repealed by Congress in 1978.
255. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(23)(1988).
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are required to refer to them in the third category of "statutory
citizens."
Are statutory citizens second-class citizens? There are conse-
quences attached to the method of acquiring citizenship, resulting in-
disparate treatment. Any category of statutory citizenship is subject
to amendment or even repeal. In contrast, Congress does not have the
power to determine conditions for fourteenth amendment citizenship.
The Supreme Court has stated "that the rights of citizenship of the
native born and of the naturalized person are of the same dignity and
are coextensive,"256 and lower courts have struck down legislation vio-
lating this principle. For example, in Feran.ez v. Georgia,257 the
court held that a Georgia statute requiring that state troopers be na-
tive-born rather than naturalized citizens violated the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment because distinctions could not be
made between types of citizens. However, in Rogers v. Bellei, the
Supreme Court stated that statutory citizenship is an expression of
"congressional generosity,"2 58 suggesting that there is room for some
distinction. The distinction that has been the subject of much debate,
but never decided by the Supreme Court, is whether the Constitu-
tional provision that only a "natural born" citizen is eligible to be
President25 9 applies to statutory citizens. 260 The Supreme Court has
stated that "naturalized" citizens are ineligible for the Presidency.26 '
Therefore, if statutory citizens are considered to be naturalized citi-
zens, rather than birth-right citizens, they would not be eligible for
the presidency.
Congress has expressly rejected arguments in favor of a jus soli
only policy for acquisition of citizenship at birth. Early naturalization
statutes as well as British law conferring citizenship through jus
sanguinis principles had referred to these citizens as "natural born."
The confusion has resulted in large part from the definition of "natu-
ralization" in the 1940 Act. The authors of the definition were a Cabi-
net Committee appointed in 1933 by President Franklin D. Roosevelt
composed of the Secretary of State, Attorney General, and the Secre-
tary of Labor. They recommended a limiting definition but stated that
it was "expressly limited to the use of the term for purposes of [the
Act]. '"262 The committee found that a definition limiting naturaliza-
tion to acquisition of citizenship after birth included derivative natu-
ralization of minors as well as collective naturalization. Citing
256. Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 165 (1964).
257. 716 F. Supp. 1475 (M.D. Ga. 1989).
258. Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815, 835 (1971).
259. U.S. CONST. art. U, § 1, cl.5.
260. See supra text accompanying notes 29-32.
261. See, e.g., Schneider v.Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 165-77 (1944).
262. Hearings on H.R. 6127 Before the Comm. on Immigration and Naturalization,
76th Cong., 1st Sess. 413 (1938).
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Boyd,263 the committee found it was in conformance to the generally
accepted use of the term to not apply to "the conferring of the nation-
ality of a state, jus sanguinis, at birth, upon a child born abroad." 264
As the committee saw it, citizenship could be conferred byjus soli, jus
sanguinis, or by naturalization. The acquisition of citizenship at
birth-whetherjus soli orjus sanguinis was one category and natural-
ization was another. The recommended statute which was adopted by
Congress included this new definition, an enumeration of the various
means of acquiring citizenship at birth, and a separate procedure for
naturalization. We are thus left with two separate uses of the term
naturalization-one by Congress and one by the Constitution.
Commentators have made convincing arguments that citizens born
abroad should be considered native-born or natural born thereby al-
lowing them to be eligible to become President.26 5 Support for this
position is found in the historical treatment of jus sanguinis citizens
as natural born. No such support is found with respect to Indians. An
interesting question that is raised but that is beyond the scope of this
Article is whether Elk excludes Native Americans from the
Presidency.
Citizenship can be acquired jus soli by every race and nationality
except Native Americans pursuant to the fourteenth amendment.
The fourteenth amendment should be reinterpreted to apply to Native
Americans.
Schuck and Smith have proposed a reinterpretation of the citizen-
ship clause with the objective to "achieve a law of citizenship at birth
that is theoretically consistent, practical for addressing current policy
problems, and consonant with the nation's fundamental claim that its
government rests on the consent of the governed."266 Their proposed
reinterpretation would not require overriding any prior decisions but
would require a reading of "subject to the jurisdiction thereof" to re-
fer only to citizens and permanent residents, resulting in an exclusion
from the grant of birth-right citizenship to children of illegal aliens
and nonimmigrants. Their stated objective is consistent with the in-
clusion of Indians as fourteenth amendment citizens. Further, the
proposal does suggest a resolution to the exclusion of Indians from
this clause. It was perhaps a plausible argument at the time that Elk
was decided that all Indians were not born subject to the jurisdiction
of the United States. The tribal relationships with the United States
were unresolved. There is no sustainable argument that Indians are
263. Id. at 415
264. 1& at 414.
265. See, e.g., Note, The Natural-Born Citizen Clause and Presidential Eligibility: An
Approach for Resolving Two Hundred Years of Uncertainty, 97 YALE L.J. 864;
Gordon, supra note 251.
266. P. SCHUCK & R. SMITH, supra note 15, at 116.
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now not completely subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
The reinterpretation could occur without expressly overruling Elk.
The fourteenth amendment could be construed to apply to Indians
based upon subsequent legislation and judicial interpretations that
have brought Indians completely within the jurisdiction of the United
States.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Both Boyd and Elk represent problems encountered early in our
attempt to resolve claims to citizenship. The troublesome procedural
issues presented in Boyd were easily addressed through legislation,
eliminating in most situations a need to consider subjective intent. In-
tent is provided by the act of seeking naturalization. Nevertheless, we
continue to try to determine the appropriate form of legislation for the
naturalization process. The two main principles relied upon, collective
naturalization and derivative citizenship, remain as available sources
for providing claims to citizenship and have been further refined. Col-
lective naturalization granted citizenship to Puerto Ricans even
though the territory was not granted statehood.267 Similarly, resi-
dents of Hawaii,268 various states upon their admission to the
Union,269 and Alaska270 became citizens through collective naturaliza-
tion. Although there was some dispute as to whether the Court held
267. Puerto Ricans became citizens through statutory enactment. Act of Mar. 2, 1917,
ch. 145, § 5, 39 Stat. 951, 953 (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1402 (1988)). The
problems that may be associated with collective naturalization in the Puerto Ri-
can experience is beyond the scope of this Article. However, Jose A. Cabranes has
prepared a detailed study of the how the granting of citizenship to Puerto Ricans
while maintaining Puerto Rico in colonial status has effected the Puerto Rican
people. In his study, he also examines why at the same time Puerto Rico was not
granted statehood, its people became citizens and the people of another territory,
the Philippines, were not granted citizenship. J. CABRANES, Cr=IZENSHIP AND THE
AMERICAN EMPIRE: NOTEs ON THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
CrizENsHIP OF PuERTO RIcANs (1979).
Additionally, in 1872 Congress enacted a statute which provided for the collec-
tive naturalization of "all persons born in... the Territory of Oregon." Act of
May 18, 1872, ch. 172, § 3, 17 Stat. 122, 134.
268. The Republic of Hawaii sought and received annexation to the United States in
1898. In 1900, Congress enacted a statute providing that U. S. citizenship was
granted to all inhabitants of Hawaii who were citizens of the Republic of Hawaii
at the time of its annexation. Act of April 30, ch. 339, 31 Stat. 141, codified at
Immigration and Nationality Act § 305, 8 U.S.C. § 1405.
269. Admission to statehood can either be to a sovereign state or a territory. Texas, for
example, was considered a sovereign state at the time of its annexation in 1845.
Texans became citizens by the terms of the congressional resolution approving
the annexation. In Boyd, Nebraska's admission was characterized as the admis-
sion of a territory to statehood. See supm text accompanying notes 77-81.
270. The treaty between Russia and the United States for the purchase of Alaska in
1867 involved territorial cession by treaty and included the grant of United States
citizenship to all inhabitants who did not elect to retain Russian allegiance (ex-
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Boyd that the Governor was a citizen based upon the principle of col-
lective naturalization, courts having occasion to decide a related ques-
tion have cited Boyd for this proposition.271
Elk has left us with a more troublesome legacy. Native Americans
acquire citizenship based upon statutes which are always subject to
amendment or repeal. While Congress has included Native Ameri-
cans among the individuals that acquire citizenship upon birth in the
United States, they are the only group of statutory citizens born in the
United States. This could prevent their right of full participation in
the political community unless Elk is construed to be limited in its
application to the relationship of the federal government to Indians as
it existed in the late nineteenth century.
cept uncivilized native tribes). Treaty with Russia, Mar. 30, 1867, United States-
Russia, 15 Stat. 539.
271. Bahuaud v. Bize, 105 F. 485, (C.C.D.Neb. 1901)(citizen of France who had declared
his intention to become a citizen in 1965 after residing in Nebraska since 1860 and
voting in numerous elections became a citizen upon Nebraska's admission into
the Union pursuant to the holding in Boyd); Bolln v. Nebraska, 176 U.S. 83, 88
(1900) ("[Ihe legislation of Congress connected with the admission of Nebraska
into the Union, so far as it bore upon the question of citizenship, was fully consid-
ered by this court in the case of Boyd v. Thayer, 143 U.S. 135, and the conclusion
reached that upon its admission into the Union the citizens of what had been the
Territory became the citizens of the United States and of the State"); City of
Minneapolis v. Reum, 56 F. 576, 580 (8th Cir. 1893)(describing the holding of
Boyd, "Gov. Boyd was there held to be one of a class of foreign-born residents
that was naturalized by the acts of congress admitting the state of Nebraska into
the Union").
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